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They Will Survive—Again: CLO Resilience Amid the 
COVID-19 Pandemic 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”) have garnered a lot of 
attention in recent years, from popular news outlets,1 politicians,2 and 
market observers alike.3  However, this admission is where the consensus 
ends, as the strengths and shortcomings of CLOs have been fiercely 
debated in the years following the 2008 financial crisis.4  Despite 
emerging from the last financial crisis largely unscathed,5 the asset class 
has not been permitted to ride the coattails of its successes into the present 
 
1. See Matt Phillips, Wall Street Loves These Risky Loans. The Rest of Us Should Be Wary., 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/business/economy/clo-
corporate-loans.html [https://perma.cc/7CZM-CJRK] (covering CLOs because they have 
become one of the “hottest investments on Wall Street”).  
2. See Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Sen., to Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the 
Treasury, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Joseph Otting, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Jerome Powell, 
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve  Sys., Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018.11.14%20Letter%20to%20Regulators
%20on%20Leveraged%20Lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CZM-CJRK] [hereinafter Warren 
Letter] (making specific reference to CLOs in a letter condemning the state of the leveraged 
loan market). 
3. See Stephen Brown & Abraham Salander, Amid COVID Market Volatility, Are CLOs 
the Next RMBS?, LAW360 (Apr. 20, 2020, 6:52 PM), 
https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/19853/original/brown%20salander%20Law36
0%20April%2020%202020.pdf?1587500081 [https://perma.cc/6X9L-BB9Y] (“For the past 
several years, market observers have warned of risks associated with collateralized loan 
obligations, or CLOs.”). 
4. See Telis Demos, What We Talk About When We Talk About CLOs, WALL ST. J. (June 
10, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-
clos-11591786801 [https://perma.cc/8T3Q-MBJ3] (“There were many debates about the risks 
of CLOs during the debt-market boom of the past few years.”).  
5. See YAN CAO ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS IN 
THE AGE OF COVID-19, at 1 (2020), Westlaw, 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Articles/Collateralized-Loan-Obligations-in-the-
Age-of-COVID-19/Collateralized-Loan-Obligations-in-the-Age-of-COVID-19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TR8L-ZJE8] (noting that CLOs escaped the 2008 financial crisis “relatively 
unscathed”). 
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day and avoid scrutiny.6  Instead, CLOs have been the object of mounting 
criticism—a reality that is, at least in part, traceable to the meteoric 
growth of the CLO market.7 
Today, the CLO market in the United States is valued at just 
under $700 billion, more than double its size in 2008.8  Although this 
figure only amounts to roughly one-tenth of the American mortgage 
market before the 2008 crisis,9 it has not stopped critics of the CLO 
market from comparing CLOs to the infamous collateralized debt 
obligations that precipitated the last financial collapse.10  Moreover, 
critics point to recent trends in the CLO market, namely the securitization 
of large amounts of poor-quality corporate debt, to suggest that CLOs 
could pose a risk to the stability of the financial system.11  
Prior to 2020, concerns about the risks building in the CLO 
market were well documented.12  Nevertheless, even those who pointed 
 
6. See FIN. STABILITY BD., VULNERABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH LEVERAGED LOANS AND 
COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS  1 (2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/P191219.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVM5-63H6] (acknowledging that the 
growth of the leveraged loan and CLO markets has led to greater scrutiny). 
7. See Cezary Podkul & Paul J. Davies, Financial Engineering Made Risky Loans Seem 
Safe. Now They Face a Huge Test., WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/financial-engineering-made-risky-loans-seem-safe-now-they-
face-a-huge-test-11584702000 [https://perma.cc/QLE8-Z5UM] (suggesting that the growth 
of the CLO and leveraged loan markets “led global regulators to warn of potential instabilities 
building in the financial system”).  
8. See S.P. KOTHARI ET AL., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, U.S. CREDIT MARKETS 
INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND THE EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 ECONOMIC SHOCK 47 (2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/US-Credit-Markets_COVID-19_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F783-AXTF] (noting that the CLO market is valued at $642 billion and 
providing a graph that tracks the size of the CLO market from 2005 to 2019). 
9. Phillips, supra note 1. 
10. See George Oldfield & John Anthony, Collateralized Loan Obligations: Subprime 
Déjà Vu?, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2019, 12:29 PM), 
https://brattlefiles.blob.core.windows.net/files/15427_collateralized_loan_obligations_subpr
ime_dj_vu.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF9E-TD7Z] (“[A]larm bells are ringing for some market 
observers, and some investors, who cite parallels to the subprime mortgage market in the 
2004-2008 era.”). 
11. See id. (citing concerns about the “record volume of low credit quality loans being 
securitized” in CLOs).  
12. See Joe Rennison, CLOs: The Specialist Loan Vehicles Luring Yield-Hungry Investors, 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/db97c650-1ec6-11e9-b126-
46fc3ad87c65 [https://perma.cc/G82K-UAMM] (describing concerns about developments in 
the CLO market); Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (discussing the “increased riskiness” of 
CLOs); Those $700B in US CLOs: Who Holds Them, What Risk They Pose, S&P GLOBAL 
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to weaknesses in the CLO market acknowledged that the overall strength 
of the economy might serve to temper concerns and suggested that it 
would likely take an economic downturn to reveal how problems 
mounting in the CLO market could damage the economy more broadly.13  
With this in mind, 2020 should have been the year that proved 
disastrous for CLOs, effectively bringing critics’ warnings home to 
roost.14  When the COVID-19 pandemic15 prompted a nationwide 
lockdown that rattled the economy, it appeared as though the period of 
economic stability keeping problems within the CLO market at bay 
would finally end, leading to damaging losses at best, and a 2008-like 
banking collapse at worst.16  
While many of the long-term effects of the 2020 downturn will 
continue to materialize in the years ahead, CLOs so far have weathered 
the storm.17  This is not to say that the CLO market did not experience 
volatility or that it escaped the downturn wholly unscathed: ratings 
agencies downgraded CLOs, and the leveraged loans that they hold, on a 
 
MKT. INTEL. (June 21, 2019, 11:54 AM), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-
headlines/leveraged-loan-news/those-700b-in-us-clos-who-holds-them-what-risk-they-pose 
[https://perma.cc/3UTZ-EA79] [hereinafter CLOs: Who Holds Them] (“The flourishing 
market for collateralized loan obligations has come under increasing scrutiny of late by U.S. 
lawmakers and regulatory agencies . . . .”); Craig Torres & Lisa Lee, Wider Risk of Leveraged 
Loans Warrants Scrutiny, Tarullo Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 30, 2018, 9:39 AM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X43T97DS000000?bna_news_filter=banking-
law&jcsearch=BNA%252000000166c529d347ad77c7fd2e650000#jcite 
[https://perma.cc/99XH-CW86] (highlighting concerns about the leveraged loans that are 
packaged into CLOs).   
13. See Phillips, supra note 1 (suggesting that risks in the CLO market are kept at bay when 
the economy is strong). 
14. See Frank Partnoy, The Looming Bank Collapse, THE ATLANTIC (Jul.–Aug. 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/coronavirus-banks-collapse/612247/ 
[https://perma.cc/8NC9-QY94] (suggesting that volatility in the CLO market could be 
detrimental to the market as a whole).  
15. See generally Coronavirus, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/health-
topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1 [https://perma.cc/GW2U-R68Y] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) 
(providing an overview of COVID-19).  
16. See Partnoy, supra note 14 (presenting a worst-case scenario in which a distressed CLO 
market could precipitate a collapse of the banking system).  
17. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8 (suggesting that while the effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic and the economic downturn will continue to materialize in the years ahead, CLOs 
have so far “weathered the storm”). 
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massive scale.18  These widespread rating downgrades caused the price 
of CLO debt to fall, and new CLO issuance slowed considerably.19  
Despite this, the CLO market rebounded well from the downturn that 
gripped the economy in the earliest months of 2020.20  
The experience of CLOs in 2020 seems to suggest that certain 
weaknesses in the CLO market, while substantiated, might not on their 
own be capable of destabilizing CLOs in ways that prove disastrous for 
the economy as a whole.21  This Note explores why volatility among 
CLOs did not damage or upend the market as some critics feared, and it 
will end by considering what CLO performance during 2020 could mean 
for the future of the CLO market.22  
This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II provides the necessary 
background on CLOs by describing what they are and by examining the 
kinds of entities that hold CLO securities.23  Part III details specific 
criticisms of the CLO market.24  Part IV considers the impact of the 2020 
downturn by exploring why it should have wreaked havoc on CLOs, but 
 
18. See id.  (providing an overview of the ways in which COVID-19 and the economic 
downturn negatively impacted the CLO market). 
19. See Kristen Haunss, CLO Issuance Rises Slightly in Second Quarter amid Loan 
Downgrades, REUTERS (July 13, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clo-
20201half/clo-issuance-rises-slightly-in-second-quarter-amid-loan-downgrades-
idUSKCN24E20O [https://perma.cc/5K9K-3YPT] (reporting that the COVID-19 pandemic 
led to volatility and low levels of issuance in the CLO market).   
20. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8 (noting that, in light of the 2020 downturn, the CLO 
market has “fared reasonably well”). 
21. See Hannah Lang, Virus Could Deal Blow to Leveraged Loans. What’s That Mean for 
Banks?, AM. BANKER (Mar. 11, 2020, 2:26 PM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/virus-could-deal-blow-to-leveraged-loans-whats-
that-mean-for-banks [https://perma.cc/Z72S-YJXM] (acknowledging weaknesses in the CLO 
market, but suggesting that the economic impact of COVID-19 is not likely to be “a 
cataclysmic event” for mounting corporate debt). 
22. See Lisa Lee & Sarah Husband, CLOs Fight Back Against Hedge Fund Efforts to 
Siphon Value, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-25/clos-fight-back-against-hedge-fund-
efforts-to-siphon-value [https://perma.cc/W526-UFBA] (describing potential changes in the 
CLO market that could arise in response to the 2020 downturn); See also Kristen Haunss, 
CLOs Seek to Tie Assets to Loan Index after Missing out on Covid Selloff, REUTERS (June 26, 
2020, 8:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/clo-loanindex/clos-seek-to-tie-assets-to-
loan-index-after-missing-out-on-covid-selloff-idUKL1N2E301N [https://perma.cc/VNX6-
TG2D] (presenting one way the CLO market may evolve in response to the 2020 economic 
downturn). 
23. See infra Part II. 
24. See infra Part III. 
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ultimately did not, and the reasons behind this outcome.25  Part V 
examines the lasting impact of the 2020 downturn on the CLO market 
and offers a prediction as to its future.26  Finally, Part VI provides a brief 
conclusion.27  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.         An Introduction to CLOs 
A CLO is a structured credit product that, at its most basic level, 
assembles a pool of loans against which a series of debt obligations are 
issued.28  With limited exceptions, the loans pooled to serve as collateral 
for CLO debt are leveraged loans: loans made to corporate borrowers 
with below investment grade ratings.29  Roughly 90% of a CLO’s 
portfolio is comprised of these loans, which typically receive a single-B 
rating and are secured by a first-lien claim on assets of the corporate 
borrower.30  
The process of structuring a CLO begins with the CLO Manager, 
a public or private asset manager employed by the CLO, who assembles 
the loan portfolio and makes investment decisions on its behalf.31  Before 
the CLO can issue securities to investors, the CLO Manager must do two 
 
25. See infra Part IV. 
26. See infra Part V. 
27. See infra Part VI. 
28. SETH KATZENSTEIN ET AL., ICG CAPITAL MKT. STRATEGIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS (CLOS) 1 (2020), 
https://www.icgam.com/~/media/Files/I/ICGAM-V2/documents/20200603-clo-primer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P48Y-PXZK]. 
29. See Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (defining leveraged loans as below investment 
grade loans made to highly leveraged companies). 
30. See JENNIFER JOHNSON, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & THE CTR. FOR INS. POLICY 
AND RESEARCH, COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS (CLOS) PRIMER 3 (2018), 
https://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/primer_180821.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTP2-
9796] (“For ‘traditional’ CLOs, the collateral pool primarily consists of below investment 
grade, first lien, senior secured broadly syndicated bank loans (usually at least 90% of the 
portfolio) . . . .”).  
31.See CAO ET AL., supra note 5 (describing how CLO Managers are responsible for 
selecting collateral and for actively managing the CLO portfolio).  
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things.32  First, the CLO Manager will set up a bankruptcy remote, special 
purpose vehicle to hold leveraged loans and issue debt and equity 
securities to CLO investors.33  Second, the CLO Manager must assemble 
an initial pool of loans that can be used to market the CLO to potential 
investors.34  To accomplish this, the CLO Manager will often rely on an 
arranger—usually a large bank—to provide a loan (a “Warehouse 
Facility”) that the CLO Manager uses to purchase the leveraged loans that 
underly the CLO portfolio.35  Once a group of investors interested in 
purchasing CLO securities is assembled, the special purpose entity issues 
CLO debt obligations and equity securities.36  The Warehouse Facility is 
paid down with proceeds from the debt and equity issuance, and any 
remaining funds are used to purchase additional loans for the CLO 
portfolio.37 
For a period of two to five years after the CLO’s inception, the 
CLO Manager has discretionary authority to purchase and sell loans with 
the view of improving the overall credit quality of the portfolio.38  When 
a loan held by the CLO is downgraded by the ratings agencies or trades 
at a price below par in the secondary market, the CLO Manager may opt 
to sell this loan and use the proceeds to purchase a loan with better 
repayment prospects.39  Alternatively, the CLO Manager may use the 
reinvestment period to take advantage of volatility in the leveraged loan 
 
32. See, e.g., Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (explaining how the CLO Manager 
establishes a special purpose entity and relies on a warehouse loan to purchase loans for the 
CLO portfolio).  
33. See id. (describing the process by which the CLO Manager establishes a special purpose 
entity). 
34. See id. (explaining how the special purpose entity purchases loans for the CLO portfolio 
and then issues debt securities to investors). 
35. See id. (noting that large banks provide warehouse facilities for the purpose of 
accumulating loans for a new CLO). 
36. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 3 (“CLOs are asset-backed securities issued 
by a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV acquires a portfolio of leveraged loans[,] . . . 
which it finances through the issuance of securities in the form of bonds (senior and 
mezzanine trances) and equity.”).  
37. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Tale of Two Markets: Regulation and 
Innovation in Post-Crisis Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 
47, 99 (2020). 
38. JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 4. 
39. Cf. Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (explaining that because CLOs are actively 
managed, “the CLO issuer may earn additional income by trading loans”).  
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market.40  If a loan trades below par, the CLO Manager can purchase the 
loan at a discount.41  In this scenario, the CLO Manager buys the loan 
based on an assessment of the borrower's long-term repayment 
prospects.42  If the loan price recovers, or if the borrower ultimately 
repays the loan at par, the CLO stands to recognize returns in excess of 
what it initially paid to purchase the loan.43  
At the end of the reinvestment period, the CLO enters an 
amortization phase in which it pays down its investors' debt obligations 
in order of seniority.44  During this stage of the CLO life cycle, payments 
made on the loans underlying the CLO, together with any proceeds from 
loan sales, must be used to repay the principal of the CLO investors’ 
debt.45  Investors holding the senior-most tranches of the CLO are repaid 
first, followed by junior debtholders.46  Equity investors are paid only 
after the debtholders in the senior and junior tranches are repaid in full.47 
Investors in a CLO purchase debt according to their individual 
risk tolerance.48  This is possible because CLOs offer different classes of 
debt to investors in a tranched structure, which consists of highly rated 
senior debt, junior or subordinated debt, and an unrated equity piece.49  
 
40. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 2 (explaining that CLOs are actively 
managed investment vehicles in which a CLO Managers assess credit and respond to changes 
in the market by substituting loans in the portfolio).  
41. See Haunss, supra note 22 (explaining how the purchase of discounted loans could 
boost returns).  
42. See id. (suggesting that CLO Managers purchase discounted loans because they believe 
that, in the long term, the loan will recover and repay at par).  
43. Cf. id. (explaining that CLO Managers want discretionary authority to purchase low-
priced loans because they expect some loans to recover in the long term, leading to outsized 
returns). 
44. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37. 
45. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 7 (providing an overview of the amortization 
phase in which the CLO manager uses cash flows to repay outstanding CLO debt obligations). 
46. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37 (explaining that cash flows received by the CLO 
during the amortization period are used to repay investors in order or seniority). 
47. See id. (explaining that cash flows received by the CLO during the amortization period 
are used to repay investors in order of seniority). 
48. See Phillips, supra note 1 (“CLO investors aren’t all the same.  They get to pick what 
is important to them: low-risk returns or big payday potential.”). 
49. The same pool of loans serves as the collateral for each tranche of the CLO.  However, 
investors in each tranche of the CLO have a different priority on the cash flows generated by 
the underlying loans.  The senior tranches, usually rated AAA and AA, have the first and 
highest claim on payments made to the CLO.  The junior tranches, typically rated A, BBB, 
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Investors looking to be in the safest part of the CLO structure purchase 
the highest rated notes, often rated AAA or AA, while investors with 
more tolerance for risk may opt for the junior debt.50  The riskiest portion 
of the CLO structure is the equity piece, which is unrated.51 
Priority in payment is also determined according to where the 
investor’s debt sits within the CLO structure.52  Money is distributed to 
the CLO when corporate borrowers pay interest or principal on the 
leveraged loans underlying the CLO.53  These payments are then passed 
on to CLO investors according to a “waterfall” in which the senior-most 
tranche receives its payment of interest or principal first, followed by the 
junior tranche, with any remaining funds flowing to equity investors.54  
The interest payments that CLO investors receive on the securities they 
purchase vary, as investors in the senior tranche receive a lower rate of 
interest than investors in the junior, more risky tranches.55  Equity 
investors assume the most risk because they sit at the bottom of the 
payment waterfall56 and are therefore often paid much higher rates of 
interest.57 
Certain structural features called credit enhancements exist to 
reduce risk and protect the investments of CLO debtholders.58  The first 
of these protections, called interest coverage tests (“IC Tests”), seeks to 
ensure that a CLO has sufficient cash flows to service its debt 
 
and BB, are next in line to claim cash flows of the CLO.  Finally, an unrated equity tranche 
typically receives any excess cash flows.  KATZENSTEIN, supra note 28, at 3. 
50. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 7 (describing the risk profile of each tranche 
in the CLO structure).   
51. See JOHNSON, supra note 30 (suggesting that investors with the highest tolerance for 
risk often hold the unrated equity portion of the CLO). 
52. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37 (explaining that payments to CLO debtholders 
are distributed according to seniority). 
53. See Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (explaining that a CLO satisfies its debt 
obligations by passing on the cash it receives from borrowers when they make payments on 
their loans).  
54. See, e.g., KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 3 (outlining the process by which 
payments are made to CLO debt and equity holders). 
55. See CAO ET AL, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining how holders of senior CLO debt are paid 
lower rates of interest than holders of junior debt and equity). 
56. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 3 (noting that equity investors have a claim 
on cash flows only after all debt obligations of the CLO have been paid in full). 
57. See CAO ET AL, supra note 5, at 2 (reporting that equity investors recognize a greater 
rate of return than CLO debtholders). 
58. KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 4. 
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obligations.59  IC Tests are conducted regularly and, in order to pass, the 
interest income generated by the CLO’s underlying loans must exceed 
the interest it owes to its debtholders.60  Any excess interest paid to the 
CLO is distributed to its equity investors.61 
CLOs are also subject to overcollateralization tests (“OC Tests”), 
which require the principal value of the loans underlying the CLO to 
exceed the value of its outstanding debt obligations.62  When proceeds 
from the underlying loans are paid to the CLO, the CLO must satisfy its 
OC Tests before passing payments on to its debtholders.63  For instance, 
a CLO that must return $500 million in principal to its debt investors 
might be required to purchase $625 million of leveraged loans to serve as 
collateral for the CLOs debt.64  In this example, the overcollateralization 
ratio would be 1.25, and the CLO would have to demonstrate its 
compliance with this requirement at the time it seeks to distribute 
payments to investors.65  
OC Tests are designed to protect the investments of CLO 
debtholders, especially those who invest in the senior tranches of the CLO 
structure.66  A CLO that fails its OC Test will cut off payments to its 
junior debtholders and equity investors in order to direct all cash flows to 
holders of the senior-most debt.67  Moreover, any proceeds generated by 
the CLO’s underlying loans will be redirected to repay the principal, not 
 
59. JOHNSON, supra note 30.  
60. Id. 
61. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL, supra note 28, at 3 (explaining that equity investors have a 
claim on excess cash flows after all debtholders are paid). 
62. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 14. 
63. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 4 (explaining how the CLO structure must pass certain 
performance-based tests on payment dates). 
64. See SCOTT MINERD ET AL., GUGGENHEIM, UNDERSTANDING COLLATERALIZED LOAN 
OBLIGATIONS 3 (2019), 
https://www.guggenheiminvestments.com/cmspages/getfile.aspx?guid=4510f36e-7ed3-
4af3-98c5-6b667d7464e9 [https://perma.cc/898C-6SCH] (providing a concrete example of 
how OC Tests operate in order to ensure that the CLO has sufficient collateral to service its 
obligations to its debt investors).  
65. Id. 
66. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 14 (describing how a CLO that fails its OC 
Test will divert payments to the senior tranche to guarantee the investments of more senior 
investors at the expense of investors in other parts of the CLO structure). 
67. Id. at 14. 
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simply the interest of senior debtholders.68  In this instance, the CLO 
effectively reduces the value of its outstanding debt obligations and can 
bring itself back into compliance with its OC Test requirements.69  
Ultimately, the protections for senior debtholders embedded within the 
CLO structure70 are designed to ensure that they receive what they paid 
for—an investment security that promises low-risk and stable returns.71  
B.         Who Holds CLO Securities? 
CLO securities are held by a wide variety of investors, ranging 
from banks and insurance companies to various institutional investors 
like mutual funds, hedge funds, and pension funds.72  The rapid growth 
of the CLO market has spurred efforts to identify who holds CLO 
securities.73  While it is true that the sizeable amount of CLO exposure 
held outside of the regulated banking sector makes the inquiry more 
complicated, existing data is sufficient to identify the holders of CLO 
securities with some particularity.74  
Insurance companies are the largest holders of CLOs,75 and their 
exposure to the market has grown considerably since 2016.76  As of 2018, 




70. See, e.g., KATZENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 4 (describing the kinds of credit 
enhancements embedded within the CLO structure that exist to protect investors). 
71. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 3–4 (explaining how senior debtholders assume the least 
amount of risk and are first to be paid according to the payment “waterfall”). 
72. KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 43. 
73. See FED. RESERVE BD., FED. NOTES, WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? (2019) 
[hereinafter WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES?] (noting the growth of the leveraged loan and 
CLO markets and highlighting the importance of identifying who holds CLOs). 
74. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12 (“While full transparency on a private 
credit market such as leveraged loans can be difficult to obtain, a window into who is holding 
those CLOs is possible . . . .”). 
75. Lisa Lee & Katherine Chiglinsky, A $158 Billion CLO Bet is Putting the Insurance 
Industry at Risk, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-30/a-158-billion-clo-bet-is-putting-the-
insurance-industry-at-risk [https://perma.cc/K7C5-WG25]. 
76. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12. 
77. JENNIFER JOHNSON, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & THE CTR. FOR INS. POLICY AND 
RESEARCH, U.S. INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S EXPOSURE TO COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS 
AS OF YEAR-END 2018, at 7 (2019), 
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exposure grew to $158 billion by the end of 2019.78   Life insurance 
companies are the predominant players, accounting for 77% of all CLO 
exposure among insurance companies.79  However, despite their 
increasing exposure, insurance companies invest only a small portion of 
their total assets—about 2%—in CLO securities.80 
Banks located in the United States and abroad also invest in the 
CLO market.81  Depository institutions in the United States hold roughly 
$94 billion in CLOs,82 accounting for about 18% of the market.83  Wells 
Fargo & Company is the largest holder of CLOs among U.S. banks, with 
a reported $34.6 billion in holdings, or about 2% of its total assets.84  
JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc. are the next largest holders, 
with $20.5 billion and $18.1 billion of exposure, respectively.85  
European and Japanese banks are the most significant holders among 
foreign depository institutions, with European banks holding roughly $35 
billion of CLO exposure and Japanese banks holding about $113 billion 
in CLO securities.86   
An array of institutional investors are active in the CLO market, 
as pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, and asset managers have 
sizeable CLO exposures.87  While full transparency into these private 
credit markets is difficult to achieve, piecing together available data 
provides a workable picture.88  As of December 2018, mutual funds held 




78. Lee & Chiglinsky, supra note 75. 
79. JOHNSON, supra note 77. 
80. Id. at 1. 
81. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12. 
82. CLOs: Who’s Holding (for the Long-Term)?, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N 
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/clos-whos-holding-for-the-long-term/ 
[https://perma.cc/GHB2-K2BH]. 
83. See Lee & Chiglinsky, supra note 75 (providing a chart which reflects the portion of 
the CLO market held by banks). 
84. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12. 
85. Id. 
86. CLOs: Who’s Holding (for the Long-Term)?, supra note 82. 
87. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES?, supra note 73 (“Institutional investors, 
including . . . mutual funds (16%), and pension funds (10%) held roughly half of Cayman-
issued CLOs at year-end 2018.”).  
88. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12. 
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$22 billion.89  Funds or other investment vehicles, which includes hedge 
funds, held more than $20 billion in CLOs in December of 2018.90  
Apart from understanding who holds CLOs, it is equally 
important to know what kinds of CLO exposure they hold—specifically, 
whether banks, insurance companies, and other types of institutional 
investors hold mostly senior debt, junior tranches, or CLO equity.91  This 
is because exposure type dictates priority of payment,92 and if large, 
systemically important institutions—like some of the bank holding 
companies mentioned—run the risk of nonpayment, this could lead to 
greater systemic risk.93  
A desire among depository institutions for low-risk investments 
with stable returns has led banks to invest almost exclusively in the senior 
tranches of the CLO structure.94  Roughly 95.4% of CLO holdings among 
depository institutions are concentrated in the most highly rated CLO 
debt, while bank holdings in junior and equity tranches are limited to 
3.6% and 1%, respectively.95  CLO exposure among insurance companies 
is more dispersed: roughly half of all holdings among insurance 
companies are concentrated in senior tranches, with the remaining half 
invested in the heightened risk, higher-yielding portion of the CLO 
structure.96  However, while insurance companies do hold CLO securities 
outside of the safest AAA tranche, 81% of their holdings are rated BBB 
or higher.97  
 
89. FED. RESERVE BD., FED. NOTES, WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY 
TRANCHE (2020) [hereinafter WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE].   
90. Id.  
91. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12 (suggesting that the interest in 
understanding who owns CLOs is rooted in concerns about the risk that CLOs may pose to 
the broader financial system). 
92. KATZENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 3 (explaining that payments are made to CLO 
investors according to their seniority within the structure). 
93. See Lang, supra note 21 (suggesting that the stability of the banking system is critical 
to the functioning of financial markets). 
94. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89 
(providing that 95.4% of bank CLO holdings are rated AAA).  
95. Id.  
96. See id. (providing that CLO holdings among insurance companies are divided between 
the senior, junior, and equity portions of the CLO structure). 
97. JOHNSON, supra note 77. 
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CLO holdings among pension funds and mutual funds are 
similarly dispersed throughout the CLO structure.98  Like banks and 
insurance companies, the majority of exposure among these funds is 
concentrated in the highest rated CLO debt.99  As of 2018, pension funds 
held about $16.9 billion of senior debt, $4.9 billion of junior debt, and 
$240 million in CLO equity securities.100  Conversely, mutual funds held 
$7.4 billion in CLO equity in December of 2018.101  However, the 
majority of mutual fund holdings were also confined to junior and senior 
CLO tranches, totaling $12.5 billion and $39.4 billion, respectively.102 
Exposure to the riskiest parts of the CLO structure is held almost 
entirely outside of the banking sector, as asset managers, hedge funds, 
and other investment vehicles are the largest holders of subordinated debt 
and CLO equity.103  In 2018, hedge funds and other investment vehicles 
held roughly two-thirds of their total CLO exposure in junior tranches 
and CLO equity.104  Moreover, private equity funds, credit opportunity 
funds,105 and CLO managers are the primary holders of CLO equity;106 
and while a lack of disclosure requirements among these private players 
makes obtaining concrete numerical data difficult, S&P estimated in 2019 
that 80% of all CLO equity was held by asset managers.107  
 
98. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89 
(reflecting the CLO holdings among pension funds and mutual funds). 
99. See id. (providing that mutual funds and pension funds invest 66.4% and 76.6% of their 
holdings in senior CLO debt, respectively).  
100. See id. (reflecting pension fund exposure to CLO securities, of which roughly 76% 
are concentrated in senior tranches, 22% in junior tranches, and about 1% in CLO equity).  
101. See id. (evidencing that mutual funds maintain 12.5% of all their CLO holdings in 
equity tranches, as of year-end 2018).  
102. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89 
(pointing to the fact that mutual funds concentrate 66.4% of all their CLO holdings in senior 
tranches and 21% in junior tranches).  
103. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12 (“[I]n 2018, asset managers made up 
about 40% of the equity buyers, while hedge funds made up closer to 20% and structured 
credit funds 25%.”).  
104. WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89. 
105. See generally, Richard Parkus, Introduction to Credit Opportunity Funds, DEUTSCHE 
BANK 1–21 (2007), http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/07_intro/db07_015_021_db_co.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HF2L-FXQV] (providing an overview of credit opportunity funds).   
106. See WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89 
(identifying market participants who hold the largest amounts of CLO equity). 
107. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12. 
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C.         Historical Performance and the Market Today 
CLOs entered the market in the late 1980s,108 but their 
performance during the 2008 financial crisis seems to be what many 
remember most about CLOs.109  While other structured finance 
securities—namely, collateralized debt obligations—proved catastrophic 
to the security of the financial system in 2008, CLOs escaped the crisis 
largely unscathed.110  During the last financial crisis, no CLO debt rated 
AA or AAA ever defaulted,111 and default rates among junior tranches 
were infinitesimal, amounting to less than 0.01%.112  This history of low 
default rates among CLOs is especially notable when considered in the 
context of the leveraged loan default rates during the recession, which 
peaked at just under 11%.113   
The CLO market looks markedly different today than it did in its 
earliest days, especially in size.114  The value of outstanding CLOs 
doubled between 2007 and 2018, reaching $600 billion,115 and estimates 
suggest that the U.S. CLO market surged to $642 billion in 2020.116  
Nevertheless, default rates have remained low: the rating agency S&P 
calculated a 0.41% default rate among 6,100 ratings it issued on over 
 
108. Laila Kollmorgen & Stephen Oh, Seeing Beyond the Complexity: An Introduction to 
Collateralized Loan Obligations, PINEBRIDGE INVS. (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://www.pinebridge.com/en/investor-types/default/ [https://perma.cc/QNF6-7MS3].  
109. See Joe Rennison, Coronavirus Sell-Off Puts Faith in CLOs to the Test, FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ed2dc3a9-c004-4c37-a5e3-715c1d05a2e6 
[https://perma.cc/TJ6S-2HSW] (“People tend to look backward in history saying CLOs 
survived the last financial crisis.”). 
110. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 1–2 (comparing CLOs to CDOs and referring to CLOs 
as “survivors” of the 2008 financial crisis). 
111. A CLO indenture will define what constitutes a default.  A default may occur, for 
example, if a CLO fails to make a payment due on its senior debt obligations, or if the CLO 
fails to meet its overcollateralization requirements.  Brown, supra note 3.  
112. Sally Bakewell & Lisa Lee, CLO Engineering Is No Match for Covid-19 as Payments 
Get Cut-Off, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2020, 10:59 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-30/clo-engineering-is-no-match-for-
covid-19-as-payments-get-cut-off [https://perma.cc/3F3X-J3XP]. 
113. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12 (reporting that the leveraged loan default 
rate peaked at 10.81% in November 2009). 
114. See Rennison, supra note 12 (explaining that the CLO market has experienced 
significant growth since the 2008 financial crisis). 
115. Id. 
116. KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 47. 
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1,100 CLO transactions.117  This represents just over four tranches for 
every 1,000 rated.118  Moreover, the annual default rate among leveraged 
loans has remained low,119 with a 2.93% historical average that even 
dropped to 1% for a period in 2019.120   
III.  CRITICISMS 
In recent years, the modest praise that CLOs received for their 
success in weathering the last financial crisis has largely taken a backseat 
to the mounting concerns over the $700 billion asset class.121  Criticism 
directed towards CLOs can be reduced to two interrelated ideas.  First, 
CLOs are often blamed for encouraging unsustainably high levels of 
corporate debt.122  Second, CLO demand for leveraged loans has 
purportedly fostered a leveraged lending environment in which issuers 
can secure loans on terms that are increasingly adverse to lenders.123  
 
117. From mid-1990 until 2014, the credit rating agency S&P issued more than 6,100 
ratings on over 1,100 U.S. CLO transactions.  In 2014, S&P evaluated the performance of all 
the CLO tranches they rated and concluded that default rates were notably low.  S&P: CLOs 
Show Strong Historic Performance with Few Defaults, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (Jan. 31, 
2014, 7:02 PM) https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-
headlines/leveraged-loan-news/sp-report-clos-show-strong-historic-performance-with-few-
defaults [https://perma.cc/GG9W-DUNM].  
118. Id. 
119. The CLO market is inextricably tied to the health of the leveraged loan market.  CLOs 
satisfy their debt obligations by passing on payments received from leveraged loan borrowers 
whenever they pay down their loan.  If leveraged loan borrowers default on their obligations, 
CLOs may not have the cash to make payments on their outstanding debt.  Therefore, low 
default rates among leveraged loan borrowers ultimately benefit the CLO market.  See FIN. 
STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 3–6. 
120. Despite Aging Credit Cycle, Near-Term Spike in Leveraged Loan Defaults Unlikely, 
S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (June 10, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/ [https://perma.cc/HK6C-7DAP]. 
121. See Phillips, supra note 1 (acknowledging that CLOs performed well during the last 
financial crisis but focusing predominantly on the threats that CLOs pose to the health of the 
financial system).  
122. See Warren Letter, supra note 2 (calling out CLOs for their role in fueling 
unsustainably high levels of corporate debt).  
123. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (“[A]s CLOs competed for loans to invest in, 
borrowers were able to . . . demand looser terms . . . .”). 
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A.         CLO Demand Fuels Massive Corporate Debt 
Perhaps the most obvious measure of the increase in demand for 
CLOs is the growth of the market since 2008.124  The amount of CLOs 
outstanding has more than doubled compared to its pre-crisis peak of 
$256 billion.125  This demand has been driven, at least in part, by 
historically low interest rates.126  Both CLOs and the leveraged loans they 
hold are floating rate instruments that offer yield-hungry investors a 
spread above a base rate.127  Historically, the base rate has been the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”).128  Spreads above LIBOR on 
leveraged loans can range from 1.75% to as high as 7%.129  CLOs offer 
spreads above LIBOR that increase in lockstep with the amount of risk a 
CLO investor assumes.130  For instance, investors who hold CLO debt in 
the subordinated part of the structure will be paid a spread above LIBOR 
that is greater than the spread paid to investors with exposure to the 
highest rated AAA tranche.131  However, regardless of the exact amount 
of spread, CLOs often provide investors with higher returns,132 especially 
as compared to similarly rated assets.133  Therefore, in low interest rate 
environments, the higher-yielding assets of the CLO market are 
especially attractive to yield-hungry investors.134  
 
124. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that the CLO market has 
doubled in size since the 2008 financial crisis).   
125. See US CLO Issuance Hits All-Time Record, Topping $125B, S&P GLOBAL MKT. 
INTEL. (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/6LM9-D37Q] (reporting that the CLO market peaked at $256 billion before 
the 2008 financial crisis and has since grown to become a $600 billion market).  
126. See id. (suggesting that historically low interest rates have driven investors towards 
the higher-yielding CLO market).  
127. CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. 
128. LIBOR has historically served as the base rate.  However, it is expected that LIBOR 
will be discontinued by the end of 2021 and will be replaced with an alternative reference rate 
to serve as a benchmark.  Id. at 2, 4. 
129. See Aaron Weinman, Spreads Widen in Choppy US Leveraged Loan Market, REUTERS 
(Sept. 20, 2019, 9:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usloans-spreads-
idUSL2N26B0FV [https://perma.cc/DN9Z-EZG5] (highlighting the fact that spreads on 
leveraged loans can be as low as 175 basis points or, in some cases, as high as 700 basis 
points).  
130. See CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (“The spread decreases with the relative seniority 
of a note within the CLO capital structure.”).  
131. See id. (explaining that AAA-rated CLO debt pays a lower rate of interest as compared 
to the higher interest rates paid to investors in the junior tranche).  
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CLO demand is relevant because it has fueled, or at least 
reinforced, the growth of the leveraged loan market.135  CLOs purchase 
approximately 60% of all leveraged loans and are thus the largest buyer 
of below investment grade corporate debt.136  When demand for CLOs 
increases, the demand for leveraged loans follows suit, as leveraged loans 
are the bedrock of the CLO structure.137  In recent years, demand for 
leveraged loans among CLOs afforded corporate borrowers easy access 
to a loan market teeming with eager investors.138  As a result, borrowers 
have been able to incur large amounts of debt that could ultimately prove 
difficult to repay.139  The roughly $1.3 trillion of outstanding corporate 
debt financed by leveraged loans—and fueled by CLO demand—
contributes to a persistent fear that business debt is approaching 
unsustainable levels.140  
 
132. According to data from Wells Fargo, collected as of March 25, 2020, AAA-rated CLO 
notes paid spreads above benchmarks in the mid-to-high 300 basis point area, meaning an 
extra 3 percentage points in return.  A similarly rated corporate bond paid about 142 basis 
points more than its benchmark on the same date.  Sally Bakewell, Why Leveraged Loans, 
CLOS Feed Worries in Virus Slump, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2020, 5:38 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-03/why-leveraged-loans-clos-feed-
worries-in-virus-slump-quicktake [https://perma.cc/8PAH-YEND].  
133. See US CLO Issuance Hits All-Time Record, Topping $125B, supra note 125 
(suggesting that yields in the CLO market have historically been higher as compared to other 
similarly rated assets). 
134. See id. (suggesting that investors in low-interest rate environments flock to the higher-
yielding CLO market). 
135. See Warren Letter, supra note 2 (criticizing the growth of the leveraged loan market 
and suggesting that CLOs have enabled the expansion).   
136. CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12.  
137. Cf. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37, at 98 (highlighting the fact that the CLO and 
leveraged loan markets move in “lockstep”).  
138. See Brown & Salander, supra note 3 (referencing strong investor demand and a 
“borrower-friendly” market). 
139. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (“[A]s CLOs competed for loans to invest in, 
borrowers were able to take on more debt per dollar of earnings . . . .”). 
140. See Jerome Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Business Debt 
and Our Dynamic Financial System (May 20, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20190520a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H2YY-BV7X] (“Business debt has clearly reached a level that should give 
businesses and investors reason to pause and reflect.  If financial and economic conditions 
were to deteriorate, overly indebted firms could well face severe strains.”).  
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B. CLO Demand Leads to a Deterioration in Underwriting 
Standards 
Concerns about high levels of corporate debt are almost 
inevitably coupled with warnings about the quality of the loans extended 
to borrowers.141  CLOs factor prominently in this discussion because 
CLO demand for leveraged loans is largely seen as a driving force behind 
deteriorating underwriting standards.142  The erosion of lending standards 
is best reflected in the rise of covenant-lite loans and in the proliferation 
of aggressive provisions in loan documentation (“Credit 
Agreements”).143 
1.  Covenant-Lite Loans 
Loans are considered covenant-lite when they lack requirements 
compelling borrowers to meet certain performance criteria on a monthly 
or quarterly basis; failure to meet these requirements can place a borrower 
in default.144  Maintenance covenants, while onerous for borrowers, offer 
insights as to a borrower’s ability to repay its loans.145  Thus, the lack of 
covenants in a Credit Agreement is often seen as a benefit to borrowers 
granted at the expense of lenders.146  Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, 
 
141. See Joy Wiltermuth & Kristen Haunss, Yellen Warns of Corporate Distress, Economic 
Fallout, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yellen-
distressed/yellen-warns-of-corporate-distress-economic-fallout-idUSKCN1QG2CZ 
[https://perma.cc/R3DV-B3ZR] (“At the same time corporate buyout leverage [increased]. . . 
lender protections weakened . . . .”). 
142. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (“As CLOs competed for loans to invest in, 
borrowers were able to take on more debt per dollar of earnings at lower rates, and to demand 
looser terms, known as covenants.”). 
143. See Kristen Haunss, Regulators Concerned About Material Loosening in Leveraged 
Loan Market, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2018, 2:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/regs-
loans/regulators-concerned-about-material-loosening-in-leveraged-loan-market-
idUKL2N1X41JA?edition-redirect=ca [https://perma.cc/7GDL-CTXS] (discussing 
covenant-lite loans and the incorporation of aggressive Credit Agreement provisions that pose 
risks to lenders). 
144. ERIC GOODISON & MARGOT WAGNER, COVENANT-LITE LOANS: OVERVIEW 1, 5 (2019), 
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3978887/goodison_wagner_practicallaw_aug2019_updat
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS95-FDT6].  
145. See id. (explaining covenants as beneficial to lenders because of their ability to alert 
lenders before a borrower defaults on their loan).  
146. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 8 (suggesting that covenant-lite loans are a 
benefit to borrowers and a detriment to lenders). 
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covenant-lite loans represented only a small fraction of the market.147  By 
contrast, roughly 80% of leveraged loans today are covenant-lite.148  
Competition among CLO investors for leveraged loans has effectively 
allowed borrowers to market covenant-lite credit facilities without the 
risk that lenders will demand more traditional lender protections or refuse 
to lend altogether.149  
2.  Aggressive Provisions in Credit Agreements 
Amidst a backdrop of surging demand for leveraged loans and 
CLOs, traditional lender protections in Credit Agreements have been 
eroded by terms that give borrowers greater flexibility.150  Regulators and 
market participants identified three specific areas in Credit Agreements 
where new, more borrower-friendly terms threaten to undermine the 
protections that secured lenders have long relied on when providing loans 
to below investment grade corporate borrowers.151  First, Credit 
Agreements have incorporated provisions—incremental facilities—that 
allow borrowers to incur additional debt, often without consulting 
existing lenders.152  This ability to tack on additional debt is especially 
 
147. See Sam Goldfarb & Avantika Chilkoti, Regulators, Investors Zero in on Corporate 
Debt Market, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2019, 10:14 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-investors-zero-in-on-corporate-debt-market-
11558958401 [https://perma.cc/B47Y-HBWQ] (reporting that in 2006 only 6% of loans were 
covenant-lite); Covenant-Lite Leveraged Loans: After Default, Whither Recoveries?, S&P 
GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (July 23, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/latest-news-headlines/leveraged-loan-news/covenant-lite-leveraged-loans-default-
whither-recoveries [https://perma.cc/LFV8-VJ23] (noting that in 2007 only 29% of the 
leveraged loan market was considered covenant-lite). 
148. Phillips, supra note 1 ("So-called covenant lite loans now account for roughly 80 
percent of the new leveraged loans on the market.”). 
149. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 8 (“[D]eals have experienced looser 
covenants, likely driven by high availability of funding and competition for loan mandates by 
arrangers.”).   
150. See id. at 7–8 (describing the erosion of traditional lender protections in Credit 
Agreements and attributing this development to a competitive market).  
151. See Haunss, supra note 143 (describing some of the borrower-friendly terms being 
incorporated into Credit Agreements). 
152. See Gary L. Storck & Mark D. Sheely, Leveraged Lending: Evolution, Growth and 
Heightened Risk, in 16 SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 10, 15 (2019), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sifall19/si-fall-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N7H9-A4XF] (“[M]any credit agreements allow borrowers the right to 
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detrimental in the context of below investment grade borrowers because, 
as indicated by their low credit rating, these borrowers already carry large 
debt loads.153  In the event of a downturn, these highly indebted borrowers 
will likely have little cash on their balance sheets to repay creditors.154   
Second, under most Credit Agreements, a borrower may take certain 
actions—like incur debt—only if it can establish that it is in compliance 
with ratios that measure its debt to earnings.155  However, many Credit 
Agreements now contain provisions that allow a borrower to artificially 
inflate its earnings by adding back certain expenses or anticipated cost 
savings.156  Research indicates that these adjustments often overstate a 
borrower’s earnings and thus understate its debt to earnings ratio,157 
allowing borrowers greater flexibility to take actions that would 
otherwise be prohibited under their loan agreements.158  Finally, many 
Credit Agreements now allow corporate borrowers to transfer assets 
outside the credit group159 thus diluting the collateral that can be claimed 
 
obtain additional debt without the current lender’s approval, an ability known as incremental 
facilities.”). 
153. See id. at 10–11 (explaining that leveraged borrowers typically have high levels of 
debt and below investment grade credit ratings).  
154. See id. at 10 (“[H]igh debt levels coupled with lower levels of liquidity may reduce 
businesses’ flexibility to respond to changes in economic conditions.”). 
155. See GOODISON & WAGNER, supra note 144, at 2 (providing that many Credit 
Agreements allow borrowers to incur an unlimited amount of debt if the borrower meets an 
incurrence test, like a maximum leverage ratio). 
156. See Aaron Weinman, US Investors Sound Alarm over Projected Add-Backs, REUTERS 
(May 9, 2019, 2:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/investors-addbacks/us-investors-
sound-alarm-over-projected-add-backs-idUSL2N22L1MK [https://perma.cc/Z2ZE-EPYQ] 
(“Borrowers . . . have in recent years ramped up their usage of add-backs, or projected cost 
savings . . . in a bid to make leverage calculations more palatable to both investors and 
regulators.”). 
157. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 9 (explaining how add-backs can artificially 
increase earnings and thus understate a borrower’s debt to earnings ratio).  
158. See The Arc of the Covenants, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/the-arc-of-the-covenants/ [https://perma.cc/9URG-
SJ9V] (suggesting that the impact of add-backs “cascade” through other credit agreement 
provisions, making many of the activities governed by leverage ratios easier to undertake). 
159. A borrower may transfer assets away from secured lenders who have a claim on those 
assets by moving them to an entity called an unrestricted subsidiary.  Unrestricted 
subsidiaries, unlike restricted subsidiaries, are not parties to the Credit Agreement.  This 
means that unrestricted subsidiaries are not subject to the limitations imposed on borrowers 
under the Credit Agreement, and these unrestricted subsidiaries can be used to protect assets 
from seizure in the event a borrower cannot repay their loan.  Brad Cheek, Note, Tearin’ Up 
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by lenders in the event of default.160  The vast majority of Credit 
Agreements contain carve-outs that permit borrowers to transfer assets to 
subsidiaries that are not a party to the Credit Agreement, up to a stated 
amount.161  Individually, these borrower-friendly provisions undermine 
the safety of lender investments.162  However, taken together, these terms 
amplify the risk lenders assume when extending credit to below 
investment grade corporate borrowers.163  CLO demand for leveraged 
loans has allowed borrowers to incorporate some or, in some cases, all of 
these provisions into their Credit Agreements.164  
C.         The Regulatory Landscape  
The fact that demand from unregulated investors—like CLOs—
prompted massive growth in the leveraged loan market and the 
deterioration of underwriting standards did not go unnoticed by federal 
regulators.165  In 2013, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(“Federal Reserve”), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) jointly issued Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending 
(“Guidance”).166  The Guidance was designed to provide agency-
 
iHeart: The Recent Trend with Troubled Companies and The Unrestricted Subsidiary 
Transfer Tactic, 23 N.C. Banking Inst. 271, 273–74 (2019). 
160.  See Joe Rennison & Colby Smith, Debt Machine: Are Risks Piling up in Leveraged 
Loans?, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.ft.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZP46-JBN6] 
(describing how an increasing number of credit agreements come with “few of the lender 
protections that were once standard,” and explaining how recent loan documentation often 
includes the ability to “move assets out of the reach of lenders.”). 
161. See id. (“Of the top 20 private equity-sponsored loan deals in 2018 approximately 80 
per cent contained a loophole that could see loan investors’ claim on collateral diluted . . . .”). 
162. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 7–11 (examining the weaknesses in credit 
documentation and explaining how these weaknesses can disadvantage lenders).   
163. Id. at 7–11. 
164. See Rennison, supra note 12 (“[S]trong demand from CLOs has helped to shred many 
of the investor protections that were once routinely embedded in loan documents . . . .”).   
165. See Joint Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Agencies Issue Updated Leveraged 
Lending Guidance (Mar. 21, 2013), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20130321a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Z8NQ-TW4S] (announcing the release of updated leveraged lending 
guidance in response to the deterioration of loan underwriting standards).  
166. Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766, 17766 (Mar. 22, 
2013). 
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supervised institutions with “high-level principles related to safe and 
sound leveraged lending activities.”167  Specifically, the Guidance urged 
regulated lenders not to extend loans that could not be repaid within five 
to seven years, and to avoid financing any loan that would elevate a 
borrower’s debt to earnings ratio above six times.168  While the Guidance 
may have curtailed leveraged lending among banks for a short time,169 it 
was ultimately an imperfect attempt to stymie the growth of the leveraged 
loan market and enforce stricter lending standards among banks.170  
The Guidance was incapable of influencing underwriting 
standards in the long-term because federal regulators backed away from 
the Guidance171 after it was challenged in 2017 and subsequently 
reviewed by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”).172  
According to the GAO, the Guidance constituted a rule that needed to 
comply with the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) before it could be 
made effective.173  Rather than reissue the Guidance to conform with the 
requirements under the CRA, federal regulators took the opposite 
approach.174  In September of 2018, the Federal Reserve, in collaboration 
with four other agencies, issued an Interagency Statement Clarifying the 
 
167. Id.  
168. See id. at 17773, 17775 (explaining the agency’s view of what constitutes “adequate 
repayment capacity” and suggesting that corporate leverage above six times “raises 
concerns”).  
169. See Sooji Kim et al., Did the Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending Work?, 
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (May 16, 2016), 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/05/did-the-supervisory-guidance-on-
leveraged-lending-work.html [https://perma.cc/4GVS-46PU] (reporting a decline in 
leveraged lending among banks after the passage of the Guidance).  
170. See Kristen Haunss, Regulatory Crackdown Unlikely in US Leveraged Loan Market, 
REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2019, 11:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/regulatory-crackdown-
unlikely-in-us-leve/regulatory-crackdown-unlikely-in-us-leveraged-loan-market-
idUSL1N2120Q6 [https://perma.cc/3242-KDXB] (suggesting that the Guidance had an 
“insufficient effect” on tightening underwriting standards in the leveraged loan market).   
171. See Warren Letter, supra note 2 (criticizing federal regulators from backing away 
from the Guidance instead of building upon it). 
172. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-329272, APPLICABILITY OF THE 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT TO INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON LEVERAGED LENDING (2017) 
(noting that the GAO reviewed the Guidance at the request of Senator Pat Toomey).  
173. Id. 
174. See Hannah Lang et al., 6 Policy Responses to Leveraged Lending Fears, AM. BANKER 
(June 6, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/list/6-policy-responses-to-
leveraged-lending-fears [https://perma.cc/4JCP-DU3K] (“The regulators could have 
resubmitted the guidance, but they did not take that road.”).  
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Role of Supervisory Guidance (“Clarifying Statement”).175  The 
Clarifying Statement established that supervisory guidance—like the 
2013 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending—does not have the 
force of law and confirmed that no enforcement actions would be taken 
based on guidance alone.176  Moreover, in November of 2020, the OCC 
proposed a rule to codify the Clarifying Statement.177  With this, the 
Guidance was effectively nullified and therefore incapable of addressing 
concerns about underwriting standards in the leveraged loan market.178  
The CLO market was more directly impacted by federal 
regulation in 2014 when the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) and the Federal Reserve each issued a Credit Risk Retention 
Rule (“Risk Retention Rule”).179  Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), the SEC and 
federal banking agencies were authorized to prescribe regulations 
requiring securitizers of asset-backed securities (“ABS”) to retain at least 
5% of the credit risk in assets that they transferred, sold, or conveyed to 
a third-party.180  Under the Risk Retention Rule, CLO Managers were 
classified as securitizers.181  This designation required CLO Managers to 
retain a 5% interest in the CLOs that they managed.182  While the Risk 
Retention Rule was implemented to align the interests of investors and 
 
175. FED. RESERVE BD., SR 18-5/ CA 18-7, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE 
ROLE OF SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter CLARIFYING STATEMENT]. 
176. See id. (“Unlike a law or regulation, supervisory guidance does not have the force and 
effect of law, and the agencies do not take enforcement actions based on supervisory 
guidance.”). 
177. Role of Supervisory Guidance, 85 Fed. Reg. 70512, 70512 (proposed Nov. 5, 2020). 
178. See Lang et al., supra note 174 (explaining how the Guidance was never implemented 
as a rule and was thus, “effectively nullified”). 
179. See Credit Risk Retention (Regulation RR), 12 C.F.R. § 244.1 (2020) (providing the 
Federal Reserve’s regulation to implement credit risk retention as required by Dodd-Frank); 
Credit Risk Retention, 17 C.F.R. § 246.1 (2020) (providing the SEC’s regulation to implement 
credit risk retention as required by Dodd-Frank). 
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
941(b), 15 U.S.C. 78o-11(c), (g)-(h) (2018). 
181. See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77650–51, 77653, 77659 (Dec. 24, 
2014) (“[T]he agencies believe that CLO managers are clearly included within the statutory 
definition of ‘securitizer’. . . .”).  
182. Id. at 77651. 
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securitizers,183 it had another important effect on the CLO market: smaller 
CLO managers without the capital required to retain the mandatory 5% 
interest were forced out of the market.184  
Ultimately, the impact of the Risk Retention Rule on the CLO 
market was short-lived.185  In 2018, federal regulation of the CLO market 
was significantly curtailed pursuant to a successful lawsuit brought by the 
Loan Syndications and Trading Association (“LSTA”).186  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sided with the LSTA in 
their suit against the SEC and the Federal Reserve, which challenged the 
Risk Retention Rule as applied to CLO Managers.187  The court held that 
CLO Managers are not in fact securitizers under Section 941 of Dodd-
Frank, and this finding exempted CLO Managers from the requirements 
of the Risk Retention Rule.188  The 2020 downturn, therefore, 
materialized after federal regulation of the leveraged loan and CLO 
markets—in the form of the Guidance and the Risk Retention Rule—had 
been significantly scaled back.189 
 
183. See Elliot Gantz & Phillip Black, CLO Risk Retention: A Case Study in Regulatory 
Indiscretion, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 75, 75 (2020) (explaining the “potential conflict of 
interest” between loan originators and investors in the ABS market). 
184. See Risk Retention Could Hurt CLO Investors by Increasing Correlation, Decreasing 
Diversity, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/risk-retention-could-hurt-clo-investors-by-increasing-
correlation-decreasing-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/E3V9-6PJS] (explaining that the risk 
retention requirement is likely to reduce CLO formation, especially among smaller managers 
without sufficient capital to purchase and retain 5% of the notes of new CLOs).  
185. See Kristen Haunss, CLO Risk Retention Now Just a Memory as Final Appeal 
Deadline Passes, REUTERS (May 11, 2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
clos-supremecourt/clo-risk-retention-now-just-a-memory-as-final-appeal-deadline-passes-
idUSKBN1IC21S [https://perma.cc/2L8F-ZC5J] (reporting that CLO Managers “are now 
completely free” from the requirements imposed by the Risk Retention Rule).  
186. See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n & Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 882 F.3d 220, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that CLO 
Managers are not subject to the Risk Retention Rule).  
187. Id.  
188. Id. at 222. 
189. See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n, 882 F.3d 220 (holding that CLO Managers 
are not subject to the requirements of the Risk Retention Rule); CLARIFYING STATEMENT, 
supra note 175 (explaining that supervisory guidance does not have the force of law).  
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IV.  CLO PERFORMANCE DURING THE 2020 DOWNTURN 
A.         The CLO Response to the 2020 Downturn  
In light of the criticism directed towards the CLO market, the 
economic downturn wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic should have 
been disastrous for CLOs—and some predicted that it would be.190  The 
pandemic ended the longest economic expansion in United States 
history191—a prosperity that may have sanctioned inaction with respect 
to longstanding concerns about the CLO and leveraged loan markets.192  
In response to the spread of COVID-19 and the nationwide lockdown, 
many businesses closed their doors, flights and vacations were cancelled, 
and life seemed to come to a rapid halt.193  As a result, the pandemic 
caused material damage to businesses and companies across almost all 
corporate sectors.194  For many corporate borrowers, revenue shortfalls, 
supply chain disruption, and reduced demand were commonplace when 
lockdown measures took effect.195  Speculative-grade corporate 
borrowers, whose high debt loads become difficult to repay when 
 
190. See Partnoy, supra note 14 (discussing the potential for a bank collapse caused by 
distress in the CLO market). 
191. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schulze, The Coronavirus Recession is Unlike any Economic 
Downturn in US History, CNBC (Apr. 8, 2020, 12:33 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/08/coronavirus-recession-is-unlike-any-economic-
downturn-in-us-history.html (explaining that, prior to the pandemic, GDP had expanded for 
a record 126 months, unemployment was at a fifty-year low, economic growth was steady at 
around 2%, and stock markets were at record highs). 
192. See Phillips, supra note 1 (suggesting that there are many reasons to be concerned 
about the CLO market but that, because the economy is strong, there has been less incentive 
to take them seriously). 
193. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (describing the broad impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic across industries). 
194. See Hannah Zhang, Leveraged Finance: U.S. Leveraged Finance Q2 2020 Update: 
Recovery Ratings Maintain Social Distance from Credit Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic, S&P 
GLOBAL RATINGS (July 23, 2020, 2:59 PM), 
https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200723-leveraged-finance-u-s-
leveraged-finance-q2-2020-update-recovery-ratings-maintain-social-distance-from-credi-
11577544 [ https://perma.cc/SE6D-5VF2] (“[T]he pandemic has caused material damage to 
the business and creditworthiness of companies in almost all corporate sectors . . . .”). 
195. See Micah Maidenberg, Fewer Products, Localized Production—Companies Seek 
Supply-Chain Solutions, WALL ST. J.  (Apr. 26, 2020, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-disrupted-supply-chains-that-companies-are-still-
fixing-11587893401 [https://perma.cc/Y9MQ-4G2U] (reporting on supply chain disruptions 
and a decline in earnings among businesses as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic). 
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revenues decline,196 unfortunately bore the brunt of the pandemic-
induced economic damage.197   
Due to their reliance on corporate debt repayment, the leveraged 
loan and CLO markets did experience volatility, especially in the earliest 
months of the lockdown.198  Specifically, in the leveraged loan market, 
the COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed three troubling trends: downgrading 
of loans, increased default rates, and trading price decreases.199  First, a 
staggering number of leveraged loans were downgraded by ratings 
agencies, which generally reflected concerns that leveraged borrowers 
would be unable to repay their debt.200  Between March and July, the 
rating agency S&P downgraded more than 900 corporate borrowers.201  
Moreover, from March through May, the pace of loan downgrades at 
S&P outpaced upgrades by a rate of 43:1, prompting fears that a wave of 
corporate defaults would soon materialize.202  Ultimately, default rates 
among leveraged loan borrowers did increase—albeit not 
catastrophically—during the earliest months of the year, marking the 
second strain on the leveraged loan market induced by the COVID-19 
 
196. See Lang, supra note 21 (“Highly leveraged companies that either experience a 
disruption in their supply chains or reduced demand because of the coronavirus could have 
difficulty repaying their loans . . . .”). 
197. See Zhang, supra note 194 (suggesting that below investment grade corporate 
borrowers “bore the brunt” of the pandemic-induced economic damage). 
198. See Haunss, supra note 19 (“[A]s coronavirus began to spread around the world, 
market volatility hit the CLO and loan asset classes.”). 
199. See CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (highlighting the decline in leveraged loan prices 
instigated by the COVID-19 pandemic); Rachelle Kakouris, In Grim Sign, US Leveraged 
Loan Defaults Set Record in April, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/in-
grim-sign-us-leveraged-loan-defaults-set-record-in-april-58437664 [https://perma.cc/NR5J-
T9D3] (reporting a record number of defaults in April of 2020); Yoruk Bahceli, U.S. 
Leveraged Loan Downgrade Ratio Five Times Worse Than 2008-09, REUTERS (June 4, 2020, 
11:20 AM),  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-leveraged-loans-gr/u-s-
leveraged-loan-downgrade-ratio-five-times-worse-than-2008-09-idUSKBN23B2H8 
[https://perma.cc/7LN4-79ZS] (describing a spike in leveraged loan downgrades). 
200. See Bahceli, supra note 199 (describing the record level of leveraged loan downgrades 
as a response to pandemic-induced stress in the loan market).  
201. Zhang, supra note 194. 
202. See Rachelle Kakouris, US Leveraged Loan Downgrade Ratio Hits Staggering 43:1 
as Pandemic Stalls Market, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (June 4, 2020), [https://perma.cc/7J3F-
RLJV] https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-
headlines/us-leveraged-loan-downgrade-ratio-hits-staggering-43-1-as-pandemic-stalls-
market-58928285 (“As a leading indicator, rising downgrades also typically precede a period 
of increased defaults.”).  
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pandemic.203  In April, the total number of defaults reached eleven, which 
surpassed the previous monthly record of ten set in October 2009.204  
Finally, the price of leveraged loans trading in the secondary market fell 
dramatically between February and March.205  For instance, leveraged 
loan issuer Cirque du Soleil saw the price of its loan tumble to 69.5 cents 
on the dollar—down from 92.5 cents in February—when it was forced to 
cancel shows due to the pandemic.206  Falling loan prices can affect CLO 
managers trying to trade out of nonperforming loans, as they may be 
forced to sell at a significant discount.207  This can negatively impact the 
outstanding value of the debt that CLOs hold for purposes of meeting the 
overcollateralization requirements imposed by their OC Tests.208  
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resultant economic 
downturn was also felt directly in the CLO market.209  In response to 
largescale ratings downgrades in the leveraged loan market, the three 
major credit rating agencies turned their attention to the CLOs holding 
these loans and placed roughly 2,400 CLO debt obligations under review 
for possible downgrade.210  In addition, some CLOs failed their internal 
performance tests in response to widespread loan downgrades and market 
volatility.211  Notably, a CLO triggered its senior OC Test for the first 
 
203. See Kakouris, supra note 199 (highlighting an increase in defaults among borrowers 
during the month of April but acknowledging that the default rate remains below the historical 
average).  
204. Id. 
205. CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 1. 
206. Podkul & Davies, supra note 7. 
207. See Adam Tempkin, Over 10% of CLOs Fail Collateral Tests, Putting Payouts at 
Risk, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2020, 4:50 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-23/over-10-of-clos-fail-collateral-tests-
putting-payouts-at-risk [https://perma.cc/V5TY-RLB2] (explaining how loans sold at a 
discount can reduce the value of the CLO portfolio).  
208. Id. 
209. See Cezary Podkul, Expected Surge of CLO Downgrades Slow to Arrive, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 28, 2020, 6:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/expected-surge-of-clo-downgrades-
slow-to-arrive-11598653875 [https://perma.cc/2VSN-GNX5] (noting that CLO debt 
obligations were placed under review for downgrade by ratings agencies in response to 
economic volatility caused by the COVID-19 pandemic).  
210. See id. (“After the coronavirus pandemic shut many businesses this spring, the three 
major credit-ratings firms placed about 2,400 bonds tied to pools of corporate loans on review 
for possible downgrades.”). 
211. See Tempkin, supra note 207 (reporting that, according to one analysis, 13% of 
roughly 750 CLOs failed their junior OC Tests in April).  
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time since 2008.212  Finally, new CLO issuance decreased substantially, 
especially as compared to prior years.213  In the first three months of 2020, 
there was just $15.2 billion of new issuance, which was $14.1 billion 
short of the $29.3 billion issued during the same quarter in 2019.214  The 
CLO market freeze reflected investor concerns tied to falling loan prices 
and large-scale corporate downgrades.215 
Despite experiencing a bout of volatility in the earliest months of 
the year, CLOs and the leveraged loan market rebounded well.216  The 
wave of potential CLO downgrades that seemed likely at the beginning 
of the year largely failed to materialize.217  Ultimately, many CLO 
securities had their ratings affirmed or were otherwise downgraded only 
one notch.218  On the new issue front, volume gradually picked back up, 
with $3.9 billion of CLOs issued in April, $6 billion in May, and $8.2 
billion in June.219  Moreover, Wells Fargo adjusted its 2020 U.S. CLO 
issuance forecast to $65 billion, up from the $50 billion it estimated in 
May.220  Finally, the leveraged loan space also saw a gradual recovery221 
 
212. Alexander Saeedy, For 1st Time Since 2008, a CLO Triggers its Senior 




213. See Kristen Haunss, CLO Issuance Falls 48% as Rush of Loan Downgrades Threatens 
Investor Distributions, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2020, 9:55 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/cloissuance-ccc/clo-issuance-falls-48-as-rush-of-loan-
downgrades-threatens-investor-distributions-idINL1N2C50BG [https://perma.cc/56SK-
9RBL] (describing how CLO issuance slowed in the earliest months of 2020 in response to 
the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic). 
214. Id. 
215. See id. (suggesting that the CLO market froze due to falling loan prices and a wave of 
corporate downgrades). 
216. See KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 47 (explaining that CLO issuance has 
“rebounded” to almost pre-outbreak levels and suggesting that the leveraged loan market has 
stabilized).   
217. Podkul, supra note 209.  
218. Id. 
219. Haunss, supra note 19.  
220. Id. 
221. See Jonathan Hemingway, US Leveraged Loan Issuance Rebounds in Q3 after 
Pandemic-Induced Slump, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (Sept. 30, 2020), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/us-
leveraged-loan-issuance-rebounds-in-q3-after-pandemic-induced-slump-60534463 
[https://perma.cc/4V4D-46LM] (“Issuance in the U.S. leveraged loan market rebounded in 
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in a move that was important for the health of the CLO market.222  After 
tumbling in the early months of 2020, loan prices ultimately 
rebounded,223 and new issuance ticked back up, even if in fits and 
starts.224  After leveraged loan issuance bottomed out at a four-year low 
of $44.5 billion in the second quarter, the market recovered, with new 
issuance totaling $71 billion in the third quarter of 2020.225 
While it may be years before the CLO market is as active as it 
was before the COVID-19 pandemic, it appears as though CLOs have 
emerged, yet again, as “survivors”226—only this time in reference to their 
handling of the 2020 economic downturn.227  At the very least, CLOs did 
not catalyze the next banking crisis or severely destabilize the U.S. 
financial system,228 as some feared.229  The reason why CLOs—in spite 
of the criticisms they face—survived the volatility of the 2020 downturn 
without damaging the financial market is twofold.  First, government 
intervention in the form of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (“TALF”) helped to reinvigorate the CLO market after it froze in 
the earliest months of the year.230  However, the impact of TALF was 
 
the third quarter, as stabilizing conditions and increasing investor demand have drawn 
borrowers off the sidelines.”).   
222. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 28 (“[T]he leveraged loan and CLO 
markets include direct and indirect forms of interconnectedness . . . . Direct 
interconnectedness arises from . . . origination and distribution of leveraged loans to 
securitization by CLO managers . . . .”). 
223. See KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 48 (discussing the rebound in leveraged loan 
prices). 
224. See Hemingway, supra note 221 (noting the $71 billion of loans issued in the third 
quarter of 2020 and suggesting that this increase reflects a rebound in the leveraged loan 
market).  
225. Id. 
226. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 1 (highlighting that CLOs were deemed survivors of 
the last financial crisis). 
227. See KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 48 ([W]hile the COVID-19 economic shock 
initially halted new CLO issuance, the market appears headed for recovery.”). 
228. See id. at 49 (explaining that CLOs performed well when confronted with the COVID-
19 induced economic downturn). 
229. See Partnoy, supra note 14 (suggesting that weaknesses in the CLO market could lead 
to a financial collapse reminiscent of the 2008 financial crisis). 
230. See id. (explaining that TALF will have a modest, but positive, impact on the CLO 
market). 
488 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 25 
 
largely symbolic,231 and the survival of the CLO market can be mostly 
attributed to something else—the strength of the CLO structure.232  In the 
midst of the 2020 downturn, protections embedded in the CLO structure 
worked as intended; the OC Tests designed to safeguard the investments 
of AAA investors deployed properly233 and protected the investments of 
banks—whose losses could have spelled financial trouble.234 
B.         The Modest Impact of TALF on the CLO Market 
In response to the economic hardship brought on by the 
pandemic, the Federal Reserve exercised its power under Section 13(3) 
of the Federal Reserve Act235 to revive TALF.236  The first iteration of 
TALF, launched in 2008, responded to the financial crisis by providing 
loans to investors that could be used to purchase eligible asset-backed 
securities (“ABS”).237  When it was reintroduced in March of 2020, 
TALF again sought to encourage the issuance of ABS,238 which 
 
231. See Lisa Lee, CLOs, Leveraged Loans Get Partial Lifeline in Fed’s TALF Changes, 
BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2020, 5:14 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-
12/clos-leveraged-loans-get-partial-lifeline-in-fed-s-talf-changes [https://perma.cc/EG9N-
4NNU] (suggesting that TALF’s impact on the CLO market will be fairly limited). 
232. See KOTHARI ET AL., supra note 8, at 10 (suggesting that CLOs structures are designed 
to absorb risk). 
233. See Saeedy, supra note 212 (reporting that a CLO triggered its senior OC Test, which 
redirects cash flows from junior debtholders to more senior investors).  
234. See Lang, supra note 21 (suggesting that banks will be largely insulated from losses 
stemming from their CLO holdings, which is important for the overall health of financial 
markets).  
235. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
343 (2020)). 
236. Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, FED. RES. BD. (Dec. 11, 2020) 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/talf.htm [https://perma.cc/NUN6-ECMW].  
237. See Federal Reserve Establishes Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), 
DECHERT LLP (March 26, 2020) 
https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/onpoint/2020/3/federal-reserve-establishes-term-asset-
backed-securities-loan-fa.html [https://perma.cc/L4R2-BTPP] (“During the 2008 financial 
crisis, the Fed created the Legacy TALF Program to stimulate the securitization markets by 
providing financing to third party investors in highly rated ABS . . . .”).   
238. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Announces Extensive New 
Measures to Support the Economy (Mar. 23, 2020) (on file with author) (explaining that 
TALF will enable the issuance of ABS). 
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facilitated access to credit among U.S. consumers and businesses.239  The 
Federal Reserve committed $100 billion to fund loans to buyers of highly 
rated ABS like, for example, AAA-rated CLO debt.240  Ultimately, the 
passage of TALF had important implications for the CLO market because 
it provided buyers of the highest rated CLO securities access to federal 
funding.241  
In its initial guidance, the Federal Reserve placed several 
restrictions on the kinds of borrowers that were eligible to receive TALF 
funds (“Eligible Borrowers”) and on the nature of CLO debt that could 
serve as collateral for a TALF loan (“Eligible CLO”).242  However, TALF 
was ultimately amended multiple times in response to feedback coming 
from the ABS market.243  In its final form, TALF’s impact on the CLO 
market was modest at best, as an important limitation on Eligible 
Collateral curtailed the utility of the program as applied to the CLO 
market.244  Ultimately, two specific revisions allowed TALF to have a 
 
239. See Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”) Funds Resources, 
DECHERT LLP https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/hot-topic/coronavirus-business-
impact/term-asset-backed-securities-loan-facility---talf---funds-resour.html 
[https://perma.cc/7QT5-2JLA] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (“TALF supports the flow of credit 
to consumers and businesses by allowing the investment fund borrower to buy AAA-rated 
ABS with significant leverage from the Fed.”). 
240. See Matt Wirz, Fed Aid Could Restart the CLO Market by June, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
10, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-aid-could-restart-clo-market-by-june-
11586539170 [https://perma.cc/2FBW-T3UF] (“The Fed earmarked up to $100 billion . . . to 
help investors buy asset-backed debt, including the highest-quality bonds of certain types of 
CLOs . . . .”). 
241. Id.  
242. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., DECHERT LLP, CLOS AND TERM ASSET-BACKED 
SECURITIES LOAN FACILITY (TALF)– WE’RE NOT THAT DESPERATE (YET) 1 (2020), 
https://info.dechert.com/10/14115/uploads/clos-and-term-asset-backed-securities-loan-
facility-(talf)--we-re-not-that-desperate-(yet).pdf [https://perma.cc/5KKV-R23B] 
(referencing the restrictions contained in the first iteration of TALF and explaining subsequent 
revisions to the program). 
243. See FRBNY, Yet Again, Revises the TALF 2.0 Frequently Asked Questions, DECHERT 
LLP (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/onpoint/2020/6/frbny--yet-again--revises-the-talf-2-
0-frequently-asked-question.html [https://perma.cc/72GG-TJDK] (noting the number of 
revisions that have been made to TALF since its inception). 
244. See Lee, supra note 231 (acknowledging that TALF will impact the CLO market, but 
suggesting that its effect will be limited due to the requirement that Eligible CLOs must be 
static). 
490 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 25 
 
limited practical impact, but the overall effect of the initiative on the CLO 
market was largely symbolic.245 
Under TALF, Federal funds could only be employed to purchase 
AAA-rated debt in static CLOs, effectively rendering the lending 
program impractical for most of the CLO market.246  Static CLOs do not 
permit CLO managers to actively trade the loan portfolio during the life 
of the CLO and represent only a small fraction of the CLO market.247  For 
instance, static CLOs represented a mere 2% of new deals launched in 
2017 and only 5% in 2019.248  This limitation, which was not scaled back 
in any subsequent revision of TALF, served to meaningfully limit the 
utility of the program to the CLO market.249  Nevertheless, two 
subsequent changes to TALF made the program more useful to the CLO 
market, although only to a limited extent.250  
All of the revisions to TALF sought to align the program more 
closely with established practices within the CLO industry.251  However, 
the two most important updates to TALF were a clarification that Eligible 
CLOs could contain loans issued or refinanced after January 1, 2019,252 
and an update that allowed up to 65% of loans in Eligible CLOs to be 
 
245. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242 (suggesting the limited utility of 
TALF as applied to the CLO market); Lee, supra note 231 (explaining how TALF was revised 
to allow refinanced loans to serve as Eligible Collateral); Matt Wirz, Fed TALF Revision 
Could Help Clear CLO Logjam, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2020, 4:26 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-talf-revision-could-help-clear-clo-logjam-11589383995 
[https://perma.cc/S3AZ-YSDH] (noting the revision to TALF which relaxed the requirement 
that loans have covenants). 
246. See Lee, supra note 231 (explaining how the static CLO requirement under TALF 
will serve to limit the utility of the program).  
247. Id. 
248. Wirz, supra note 240.  
249. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242 (“[T]he requirement[] that CLOs 
be static . . . will further undercut the utility of the program in terms of facilitating the flow of 
credit to U.S. businesses through CLOs.”) 
250. See sources cited supra note 245. 
251. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242 (acknowledging that certain 
revisions to TALF aligned the program more closely with existing standards within the CLO 
market). 
252. In the initial TALF term sheet, Eligible CLOs included only CLOs whose underlying 
leveraged loans were originated on or after January 1, 2019.  TALF was revised to allow 
Eligible CLOs to hold loans that were refinanced on or after January 1, 2019.  This change 
was important, as it allowed loans sitting in warehouses to serve as collateral in TALF Eligible 
CLOs.  See id. at 3. 
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covenant-lite.253  The update permitting Eligible CLOs to hold a 
significant amount of covenant-lite loans was important given the fact 
that roughly 80% of all leveraged loans are covenant-lite.254  Moreover, 
the percentage of covenant-lite loans in existing CLOs portfolios is often 
between 60% and 70%.255  By aligning TALF more closely with the 
realities of the CLO market, the Federal Reserve ensured that TALF 
funds could be used more effectively by CLO market participants.256   
The TALF revision allowing Eligible CLOs to hold loans issued 
or refinanced after January 1, 2019, had important practical implications 
for the CLO market because it allowed CLO managers to finish deals that 
were initiated prior to the pandemic.257  Before the downturn, many CLO 
Managers relied on Warehouse Facilities from banks to purchase 
portfolios of loans.258  Problematically, some of these loans were never 
formally packaged into CLOs and sold to investors before market 
conditions deteriorated, so when the CLO market froze $15 to $20 billion 
of loans were left sitting in warehouses.259  Under TALF these existing 
loans could be pooled in new CLOs that Eligible Borrowers could invest 
in.260  As revised, TALF ultimately benefited the CLO market by 
facilitating the issuance of CLOs that were initiated prior to the COVID-
19 pandemic.261  TALF was also important for banks because the sale of 
 
253.See id. (indicating that up to 65% of the loans in Eligible CLOs could be covenant-
lite); Wirz, supra note 245 (“Previous TALF guidance generally limited assistance to CLOs 
that invested in new corporate loans with strong investor protections, called covenants.”). 
254. See Phillips, supra note 1 (reporting that covenant-lite loans account for about 80% 
of new leveraged loans).  
255. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242, at 3 (providing a table to show 
that covenant-lite loans constitute 60% to 70% of existing CLO portfolios).  
256. See id. (noting that the clarification regarding new issue loans could have a modest 
positive impact on the CLO market); Wirz, supra note 245 (suggesting that CLO market 
participants will be able to use TALF funds more effectively in light of the revisions to 
TALF).  
257. See Wirz, supra note 245 (suggesting that revisions to TALF will help CLO Managers 
finish deals that began prior to the COVID-19 pandemic).  
258. Robert Smith & Joe Rennison, Big Banks Left Hanging after ‘Disaster’ in Risky Loan 
Market, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/49ee0c64-cd97-4342-9f03-
fec019963fef [https://perma.cc/U6AB-3KHX]. 
259. Wirz, supra note 245. 
260. See id. (reporting that TALF may help CLO Managers close outstanding CLO 
transactions that were initiated prior to the COVID-19 pandemic). 
261. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242 (explaining how revisions to 
TALF allows loans sitting in warehouses to serve as collateral in TALF eligible CLOs).  
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CLO debt obligations is what allows a CLO Manager to repay its 
Warehouse Facility with the bank.262  When the CLO market stalls, banks 
get stuck holding the risk of this credit extension on their balance sheet.263  
Therefore, the opportunity that TALF afforded CLO Managers—to close 
CLO transactions and repay Warehouse Facilities—was also a net 
positive for banks.264 
While the practical effect of TALF on CLOs was relatively 
limited given its narrow application to static CLOs, government 
intervention nevertheless had a symbolic impact on the CLO market.265  
First, the Federal Reserve announcement regarding the launch of TALF 
sparked a rally in credit markets.266  This effect was especially significant 
given the nature of the CLO market, which reacts to shifts in the price of 
leveraged loans267 and relies on investor confidence to drive new 
issuance.268  Second, in its many revisions of TALF, the Federal Reserve 
seemed to signal both the importance of the CLOs and a willingness to 
meet the realistic needs of the market.269  The objective of TALF, 
according to the Federal Reserve, was to facilitate the flow of credit and 
“to support the longer-term, market-based financing that is critical to 
economic activity.”270  In tailoring TALF to work for the CLO market in 
practice, not simply in theory, the Federal Reserve implied that CLOs are 
 
262. Wirz, supra note 245 (explaining that CLOs sell securities to investors in order to pay 
off obligations incurred under their warehouse facilities). 
263. Smith & Rennison, supra note 258. 
264. See Wirz, supra note 245 (describing how TALF allows CLO Managers and 
investment bankers to finish deals that have been “stuck in limbo” since the beginning of the 
pandemic). 
265. See Wirz, supra note 240 (highlighting positive sentiment coming from a CLO 
Manager in response to the TALF announcement). 
266. Id. 
267. See Podkul & Davies, supra note 7 (providing an example of how the CLO market 
reacts to swings in the price of leveraged loans). 
268. See Haunss, supra note 19 (noting that CLO issuance picked up in April and May 
because investor confidence returned). 
269. See Lee, supra note 244 (reporting that the Federal Reserve appeared to consider the 
more detailed aspects of how the CLO market actually works when it announced revisions to 
TALF). 
270. The Quarterly CARES Act Report to Congress: Hearing Before the S. Banking, Hous. 
and Urban Affairs Comm., 116th Cong. 4 (2020) (statement of Jerome H. Powell, Chair, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Powell%20Testimony%205-19-20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WA9Y-PKML].  
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a vital mechanism through which credit critical to economic activity is 
extended.271  Moreover, when it revised TALF to allow covenant-lite 
loans to comprise 65% of an Eligible CLO’s portfolio, the Federal 
Reserve symbolically conformed to the industry standard272 over and 
against the crusade against covenant-lite loans in popular discourse.273  
This is important because, when presented with an opportunity to 
affirmatively signal its disapproval of covenant-lite loans, the Federal 
Reserve backed away from its principles274 and deferred to market 
custom.275  Therefore, while the practical effect of TALF on CLOs may 
have been limited at best, the program’s symbolic impact served to fortify 
the CLO market in the midst of the 2020 economic downturn.276   
C.         The Structural Strength of the CLO 
The primary reason why CLOs will be seen as survivors of yet 
another economic downturn is hardly novel.277  Even as concerns about 
ballooning corporate debt and poor credit quality mounted in the years 
leading up to 2020,278 the resilience of the CLO structure was often 
 
271. See Lee, supra note 231 (describing how a revision to TALF made the program more 
useful to CLO market participants); Wirz, supra note 245 (explaining how a subsequent 
change to TALF increased its utility in the context of the CLO market). 
272. CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242, at 3 (providing a table to show that 
60% to 70% of loans in a typical CLO are covenant-lite).  
273. See Warren Letter, supra note 2 (expressing concern over the trend towards covenant-
lite loans); Kristen Haunss, Regulators Sound Alarm About Leveraged Loan Market, REUTERS 
(Oct. 30, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/regulators-sound-the-alarm-
about-leverag/regulators-sound-the-alarm-about-leveraged-loan-market-idUSL8N1XA7MH 
[https://perma.cc/PFN6-5ZUC] (citing concerns about the prevalence of covenant-lite loans).  
274. See Haunss, supra note 273 (highlighting concerns among present and former Federal 
Reserve officials regarding the proliferation of covenant-lite loans).  
275. See CHRISTOPHER DESMOND ET AL., supra note 242, at 3 (highlighting the fact that an 
Eligible CLO under TALF may contain covenant-lite loans in an amount equal to 65% of the 
total portfolio). 
276. See Lee, supra note 231 (acknowledging the positive, but limited, impact of TALF on 
the CLO market).   
277. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 2 (suggesting that resilient CLO structures 
may mitigate losses during periods of instability).  
278. See Thomas Franck, Former Fed Chair Yellen Says Excessive Corporate Debt Could 
Prolong a Downturn, CNBC (Dec. 10, 2018, 10:40 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/11/janet-yellen-says-excessive-corporate-debt-could-
prolong-a-downturn.html [https://perma.cc/7QCE-KGN2] (citing the concerns of former 
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recognized as a factor that could serve to mitigate the systemic risk posed 
by CLOs in the event of a downturn.279  In 2020, as the economy 
stumbled, businesses closed, and loans defaulted, CLOs were afforded an 
opportunity to finally prove that speculations as to the strength of their 
structure were not speculative at all.280   
CLOs survived 2020 without crippling or severely destabilizing 
the financial system because CLO structures held up to provide investors 
with the level of protection they were promised upon making their 
original investment.281  The banks that invested in the highest-rated AAA 
tranches received the protections they expected, and therefore banks did 
not suffer losses capable of destabilizing the financial system.282  The 
subordinated debt and equity investors—who will likely experience 
losses283—also got exactly what they were promised when they invested 
in the riskiest portion of the CLO structure.284  Ultimately, CLOs were 
survivors of the economic downturn because they delivered on the 
promises they made to investors285 and because CLO investors were 
situated in tranches best suited to accommodate their tolerance for risk.286 
 
Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen regarding increasing amounts of low quality corporate 
debt).   
279. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 6, at 2 (acknowledging that resilient CLO 
structures may mitigate losses in a downturn). 
280. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 43, 47–48 (describing the challenges wrought by 
the COVID-19 pandemic and highlighting the structural protections embedded within CLOs 
that are designed to reduce risks to investors).  
281. See id. at 48 (explaining that investors in both the highest-rated CLO tranches and the 
more junior tranches are unlikely to experience losses despite the pandemic-induced 
economic downturn).  
282. See id. (predicting that the AAA-rated tranches, which banks most often hold, will not 
experience losses).  
283. See id. at 49 (“Market pricing of the CLO tranches today suggests that the market 
expects most losses would be borne by the equity layer and some by the lower rated CLO 
tranches.”); Lisa Lee, Battered CLO Investors Are About to Get a Look at Their Losses, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2020, 10:27 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-
04-20/clo-reckoning-arrives-downgrade-wave-tests-700-billion-market 
[https://perma.cc/CN9F-NK5Q] (explaining that equity investors and subordinated 
debtholders will be the first to experience losses).  
284. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 5 (“Investors with . . . a higher tolerance for risk invest 
in the equity (first-loss) tranche.”). 
285. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 48 (providing that investors in the highest-rated 
parts of the CLO structure are not expected to experience losses); Lee, supra note 283 
(indicating that investors in the riskiest parts of the CLO structure are likely to suffer losses). 
286. See id. at 46 (suggesting that risks posed by the CLO market are reduced by the 
diversity of investors that hold CLO securities).  
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1.  The CLO Structure Worked as Intended in the Face of Market 
Volatility 
The tranched CLO structure allows investors to purchase 
securities commensurate with their individual tolerance for risk.287  
Investors who opt for lower-yielding AAA debt accept lower returns in 
exchange for the protection afforded by a CLOs OC Tests.288  Conversely, 
subordinated debt and equity investors knowingly trade this protection 
for larger returns.289  Thus, the OC Tests that a CLO must pass to 
distribute payments to its various tranches are structural features that do 
not purport to mitigate losses equally across the CLO structure.290  When 
conditions in the leveraged loan market deteriorate, a CLO’s OC Tests 
serve as protective shields that prioritize payments to the AAA and AA 
tranches.291   
In the midst of the 2020 downturn, CLOs tripped their OC Tests, 
diverting payments away from equity investors and some subordinated 
debtholders in order to repay the principal of AAA investors.292  In April 
2020, it was reported that more than 10% of U.S. CLOs risked cutting 
cash payments, and by May 2020, 21% of roughly 900 CLOs cut 
payments to investors holding securities in the riskiest tranches of the 
CLO structure.293  Moreover, for the first time since 2008, a CLO tripped 
its senior OC Test.294  
 
287. See KATZENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 6 (“CLOs offer institutional investors 
access to the senior secured loan market with tailored risk-adjusted return profiles.  By 
purchasing CLOs, banks and insurance companies can obtain exposure to the senior secured 
loan market while benefitting from structural protections….”).  
288. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 3–4 (explaining that highly rated CLO tranches receive 
lower rates of interest, but also highlighting the fact that AAA rated debt benefits from 
structural protections).  
289. See id. at 3, 5 (explaining that investors with a greater tolerance for risk invest in the 
higher-yielding subordinated debt and equity tranches of the CLO structure). 
290. See CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (explaining the process by which cash flows are 
diverted from junior to senior CLO tranches in the event that a CLO fails its OC Test). 
291. Id. at 3. 
292. Tempkin, supra note 207. 
293. Id. 
294. Saeedy, supra note 212.  
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While reports of CLO performance during the 2020 downturn 
seem to suggest that CLOs performed poorly in the midst of volatility,295 
these accounts actually serve to prove that CLOs performed exactly as 
intended.296  Volatile market conditions tripped CLO OC Tests, and a 
protective shield was extended to safeguard the investments of senior 
debtholders.297  Ultimately, the AAA investors who opted for smaller 
returns in exchange for more robust protection got what they paid for,298 
as payments were diverted to guarantee the safety of their investments.299  
Conversely, the junior debtholders and equity investors who assumed 
more risk hoping to win the lottery will likely be reminded of the inherent 
risk in their investment300 after years of impressive returns.301 
2.  CLO Investors Hold CLO Securities Well-Tailored to Their Appetite 
for Risk 
While CLOs survived 2020 due to their structural strength, the 
protections embedded within the CLO structure were especially 
meaningful when considered in the context of who they protected.302  The 
type of investor that occupied each tranche of the CLO structure was 
 
295. See Sally Bakewell & Lisa Lee, CLO Engineering Is No Match for COVID-19 As 
Payments Get Cut Off, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:59 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-30/clo-engineering-is-no-match-for-
covid-19-as-payments-get-cut-off [https://perma.cc/P5RM-9QWF] (“Loans are getting 
downgraded and their value is dropping, which is triggering protections designed to protect 
the safest securities issued by CLOs, those rated AAA.”). 
296.  See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 48 (reporting that AAA-rated CLO tranches are 
not expected to experience losses). 
297. See Bakewell & Lee, supra note 295 (“Loans are getting downgraded and their value 
is dropping, which is triggering protections designed to protect the safest securities issued by 
CLOs, those rated AAA.”) 
298. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that holders of senior CLO debt receive 
less interest but are afforded greater security in the CLO structure). 
299. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 48 (reporting that AAA-rated CLO tranches are 
not expected to experience losses). 
300. See Lee, supra note 283 (predicting that investors in the high-risk, high-yield portion 
of the CLO structure will experience losses due to the 2020 downturn). 
301. Why CLO Equity, EAGLE POINT CREDIT CO., 
http://www.eaglepointcreditcompany.com/why-clos [https://perma.cc/C5JV-LXB9] (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2021) (“[Ninety-six percent] of U.S. CLOs issued between 2002 and 2011 had 
a positive return on the equity tranche, with only 4% returning less than the original invested 
capital.”).  
302. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 49 (explaining that losses confined to the equity 
tranche have a limited macroeconomic impact).  
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ultimately an important factor that allowed CLOs to weather the 2020 
downturn without prompting systemic financial instability.303  
The stability of the financial system largely depends on the 
vitality of banks, so in moments of economic peril, it is important that 
banks have the capacity to withstand losses and continue lending.304  By 
cabining 95.4% of their holdings in the senior-most tranches of the CLO 
structure305 banks sacrifice high returns for structural protections that 
allow them to avert major losses.306  In 2020, when economic volatility 
forced CLOs to cut payments to investors, CLOs made good on their 
promise to protect bank investments, as there were no defaults on AAA-
rated debt.307  Moreover, according to an analysis from Moody’s, CLO 
OC Tests will continue to protect bank investments even in the event of 
a protracted economic downturn, as it would take a cumulative loan 
default rate in excess of 80% to impair AAA securities.308  Fitch Ratings’ 
year-end default forecast suggests a cumulative leveraged loan default 
rate of 5% to 6% in  2020 and 8% to 9% in 2021.309 
While it was important for the stability of the financial system in 
2020 that banks invested in the senior tranches of the CLO structure, it 
was equally as important that asset managers, hedge funds, and other 
privately managed funds held the riskiest CLO securities.310  This is 
because a CLO’s protective shields are only effective in thwarting 
instability if losses are confined to investors capable of shouldering the 
 
303. See id. at 43, 49 (predicting that losses will be confined to equity tranches, which are 
often held by asset managers, pension funds, and other private funds). 
304. See Lang, supra note 21 (highlighting the importance of stable banks to the safety of 
the financial system and suggesting that bank losses contribute to systemic instability). 
305. WHO OWNS U.S. CLO SECURITIES? AN UPDATE BY TRANCHE, supra note 89. 
306. Cf. KATZENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 28, at 6 (providing that banks benefit from 
structural protections due to the nature of their investment in CLOs). 
307. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 48 (“[T]he AAA-rated senior tranches will not 
incur losses unless economic conditions worsen dramatically.”). 
308. See Brian Chappatta, Opinion, First ETF for CLOs is Ultra-Safe. No, Seriously., 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-
09-10/first-etf-for-clos-is-ultra-safe-no-seriously [https://perma.cc/PSY7-Q9LG] (“[T]he 
cumulative collateral default rate would have to reach 70% to 80% before double-A CLOs 
would be impaired . . . . The triple A tranche is even further out of reach.”). 
309. Credit: 2020 Hindsight, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N (July 30, 2020), 
https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/credit-2020-hindsight/ [https://perma.cc/WT7M-
UD6U]. 
310. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 43, 49 (indicating that losses will be confined to 
CLO equity tranches held by asset managers and private funds). 
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burden.311  Importantly, the investors that hold the high-yielding, riskiest 
pieces of the CLO structure are those with the highest tolerance for big 
swings in performance.312  Market volatility and losses negatively affect 
subordinated debt and equity holders, but only to a limited extent because 
the market “is not held by weak hands.”313  In 2018, for instance, equity 
investors ended the year with losses of 11.4%,  and no large-scale 
financial instability ensued.314  The story of 2020 will be largely similar, 
as losses will likely be confined to the equity investors that are better 
positioned to withstand losses.315 
V.  THE FUTURE OF THE CLO MARKET 
CLOs have evolved in the years since their inception, and CLOs 
today are notably different than those that first entered the market in the 
late 1980s.316  In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the structure of 
post-crisis CLOs changed in order to make senior tranches safer and more 
attractive.317  The passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010 also incited change, as 
CLOs refashioned themselves into vehicles that banks could invest in 
without violating the Volcker Rule.318  Considering this history of 
evolution, it is fair to ask whether CLOs might change in response to the 
 
311. See id. at 49 (explaining that losses borne by the equity layer present little 
macroeconomic risk); Lang, supra note 21 (suggesting that bank losses could lead to 
widespread disruption in financial markets).   
312. See Rennison, supra note 12 (reporting that the riskiest parts of the CLO structure are 
held by those with a high tolerance for market volatility).  
313. See id. (quoting a CLO equity investor, “[w]hen the market falls and you have to mark 
down your portfolio 10 per cent that hurts but it doesn’t create forced sellers. This market is 
not held by weak hands.”). 
314. See id. (suggesting that equity investors are able to withstand large losses without 
disrupting financial markets). 
315. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 49 (predicting losses will be realized exclusively 
among equity investors); see also CLOs: Not So Opaque, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING 
ASS’N (June 20, 2019), https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/clos-not-so-opaque/ 
[https://perma.cc/8U4M-3RRP] (explaining that asset managers are well positioned to assume 
greater risk).  
316. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37, at 100 (describing the evolution of the CLO 
structure in response to market changes). 
317. Id. at 100–01. 
318. Id. at 101. 
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economic downturn of 2020.319  So, how will CLOs evolve in light of the 
economic slowdown?  In short, CLOs may change modestly, but not 
monumentally in the aftermath of 2020.320  It is possible that in a post-
2020 landscape characterized by increased corporate defaults, CLOs may 
be permitted to hold larger amounts of distressed loans or equity received 
as part of a restructuring.321  However, apart from these potential 
developments, the CLO market after 2020 is unlikely to look much 
different from the market that preceded it.322  
A.         Post-2020 CLOs May Hold More Distressed Assets and Equity 
CLOs are limited in the kinds of assets they are permitted to 
hold.323  While a large majority of loans in any given CLO portfolio are 
rated B, CLO Managers are typically allowed to hold a limited number 
of loans with a CCC rating—usually in an amount constituting 7.5% of 
the portfolio.324  Other restrictions include an inability to purchase loans 
trading below 60 to 65 cents on the dollar325 and a prohibition against 
injecting new capital into a distressed borrower whose loan is part of the 
CLO’s underlying collateral.326  Finally, while CLOs are generally 
permitted to hold equity received in connection with a restructuring, 
 
319. See id. at 100 (describing the evolution of the CLO structure in response to market 
changes). 
320. See Haunss, supra note 22 (suggesting a way in which the CLO market may evolve 
in response to the 2020 economic downturn); Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (describing 
potential changes in the CLO market that could arise in response to the 2020 downturn). 
321. See Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (noting that some CLO Managers are amending 
the terms of their CLOs to allow the CLO greater flexibility to participate in restructurings).  
322. See Credit: 2020 Hindsight, supra note 309 (reporting that investor demand for 
leveraged loans is strong and that deal documents appear to be no more lender-friendly than 
they were prior to the pandemic). 
323. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 4 (“CLOs are structured with specific investment 
limitations . . . which aim to protect investors from potential losses.”) 
324. Id. at 4. 
325. Haunss, supra note 22. 
326. Lisa Lee & Sally Bakewell, Hedge Funds Exploit CLO Weakness Laid Bare by 
Corporate Distress, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-22/hedge-funds-exploit-clo-weakness-
laid-bare-by-corporate-distress [https://perma.cc/PVY7-T22M]. 
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holding large amounts of equity might negatively impact a CLO’s ability 
to meet its various performance tests.327  
As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic 
downturn, leveraged loan prices fell,328 ratings agencies downgraded 
many B-rated loans to CCC329 and corporate bankruptcies surged.330  In 
this new economic landscape, the constraints designed to protect CLO 
investors may ultimately prove too rigid.331  For instance, limitations on 
equity holdings and a prohibition on providing new money to a borrower 
in bankruptcy may frustrate a CLO Manager’s effort to recoup value on 
a distressed loan in its portfolio.332  In some cases, hedge funds have taken 
advantage of CLO limitations and have opportunistically cut CLOs out 
of deals during the restructuring process.333  Moreover, based on current 
limitations in CLO governing documents, CLO Managers that see long-
term value in loans trading below 60 cents on the dollar are precluded 
from purchasing these assets, potentially causing CLO investors to lose 
out on significant returns when the loans recover and repay investors at 
par.334  
 
327. See id. (“While they're allowed to receive equity in exchange for struggling loans in 
restructurings, it can be unappealing because of the impact on crucial compliance tests used 
to determine CLO investor payouts.”). 
328. See Joe Rennison, US Leveraged Loan Prices Slump to Lowest Since Financial Crisis, 
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/7e81b818-683a-11ea-800d-
da70cff6e4d3 [https://perma.cc/MTY8-NSVZ] (reporting that the average leveraged loan 
price sunk to 84 cents on the dollar, its lowest level since August 2009). 
329. See Amid Record Leveraged Loan Downgrades, B– Debt Swells, CCC Loans Test 
CLO Limits, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTEL. (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/amid-
record-leveraged-loan-downgrades-b-8211-debt-swells-ccc-loans-test-clo-limits-57959048 
[https://perma.cc/GER9-LB7F] (highlighting that the share of the S&P/LSTA Index rated 
CCC or lower rose to 7.48% in March, which represented a 1.67% increase since February).  
330. See Patrick Mathurin et al., Pandemic Triggers Wave of Billion -Dollar US 
Bankruptcies, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/277dc354-a870-4160-
9117-b5b0dece5360 [https://perma.cc/RJ9Y-YTY4] (reporting that 157 companies with 
liabilities of more than $50 million have filed for bankruptcy as of August 2020). 
331. See Lee & Bakewell, supra note 326 (explaining how CLO limitations are making it 
difficult for CLOs to take advantage of opportunities emerging in the market).  
332. See id. (explaining how limitations on holding equity and injecting capital are forcing 
some CLOs to sell distressed assets to a depressed market, which often leads to lower 
recoveries). 
333. See id. (providing specific examples of how CLOs are being deliberately cut out of 
bankruptcy deals that convert the debt of a distressed borrower to equity). 
334. Haunss, supra note 22 (describing the restrictions that prevent CLO Managers from 
purchasing loans priced below a certain threshold and explaining why some CLO Managers 
are pushing back against such limitations). 
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Two solutions have emerged to provide CLO Managers with 
more flexibility to respond to market changes prompted by the COVID-
19 pandemic.335  First, certain CLO Managers have amended their 
governing documents to permit CLOs to hold more distressed assets, and 
some are considering new ways that CLOs might be able to provide new 
capital in corporate restructurings.336  The second proposal suggests that 
loan prices be tied to an index—rather than a set price—that can account 
for market volatility.337  In this scenario, CLO Managers would have the 
ability to purchase loans that trade below 60 cents on the dollar.338 
While it is enticing to believe that greater flexibility for CLO 
Managers is a categorically positive development, opponents suggest that 
these changes could allow CLO Managers to make risky investments that 
jeopardize the returns of investors.339  For investors in the senior AAA-
rated tranche, low and stable returns are preferable to the unpredictability 
of risky distressed debt plays.340  In a typical CLO, senior debtholders 
constitute 60% of the structure,341 so there is good reason to doubt that 
the majority of CLOs will eagerly adopt changes that allow CLO 
Managers greater flexibility.342  Nevertheless, it is likely that some CLOs 
will adapt to the post-pandemic economic landscape by granting CLO 
Managers greater discretion to maximize returns on distressed assets.343  
 
335. See id. (reporting on a proposal to tie leveraged loan prices to an index); Lee & 
Husband, supra note 2 (explaining how CLO Managers are responding to the limitations in 
their governing documents which have hindered CLO Managers in their attempt to recoup 
distressed investments).  
336. Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (explaining how CLO Managers are responding to the 
limitations in their governing documents which have hindered CLO Managers in their attempt 
to recoup the value of distressed investments). 
337. See Haunss, supra note 22 (“CLO managers are now looking to tie the price at which 
a loan can be purchased to an index to account for market volatility rather than a set price.”). 
338. See id. (explaining how the proposal to tie loan prices to an index would allow CLO 
Managers to take advantage of volatility in the leveraged loan market).  
339. See Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (describing how debt investors might push back 
against giving more flexibility to CLO Managers to purchase distressed assets). 
340. See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 5 (suggesting that investors in the senior portion of 
the CLO structure have a lower risk tolerance than those in the bottom tranches). 
341. See CLOs: Who Holds Them, supra note 12. 
342. See Lee & Husband, supra note 22 (highlighting the potential for push back from 
senior debtholders in the CLO structure). 
343. See id. (providing examples of CLO Managers that have already begun to amend their 
governing documents to give managers more flexibility). 
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B.         The CLO Market Will Remain Largely Unchanged After 2020 
After the 2008 financial crisis, the CLO market experienced a 
slowdown that gradually ebbed as the economy recovered.344  The same 
scenario is likely post-2020 as the CLO market licks its wounds from the 
economic downturn wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic.345  However, 
unlike the aftermath of 2008—which saw the evolution of the CLO 
structure346—CLOs and the CLO market post-2020 will likely remain 
unchanged.347  Specifically, demand for CLOs will continue to yield 
Credit Agreements with few lender protections348 and the prevalence of 
covenant-lite loans in the market will remain the industry standard.349  
The Federal Reserve’s decision to keep interest rates low for the 
foreseeable future350 suggests that the forces which drove investors to the 
CLO market prior to the downturn will be just as strong after 2020.351  In 
 
344. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37, at 98 (noting that the CLO market experienced 
low levels of new issuance and an investor sell-off following the financial crisis but 
highlighting the recovery of the market).  
345. See Haunss, supra note 19 (describing the decrease in CLO issuance during the earliest 
months of the pandemic and suggesting that new issuance is beginning to rebound).  
346. See Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37, at 100 (detailing the evolution of the CLO 
structure).  
347. See Credit: 2020 Hindsight, supra note 309 (highlighting the fact that longstanding 
complaints about the poor credit quality of leveraged loans remain prevalent despite the 
volatility caused by the 2020 downturn). 
348. See id. (reporting that despite modest improvement in the earliest months of the 
pandemic, recent Credit Agreements suggest a return to pre-pandemic borrower-friendly 
terms). 
349. See Brian Chappatta, Opinion, The ‘Cov-Lite’ Fight in Leveraged Loans is Lost, 




hVTGtIgZkaAtNMEALw_wcB [https://perma.cc/R5QQ-6SSC] (suggesting that covenant-
lite loans are the new industry standard). 
350. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Sept. 16, 2020) (on file with author) (“The 
Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and 
expects it will be appropriate to maintain this target range . . . .”); see also James Politi & 
Colby Smith, Fed Signals Rock-Bottom Rates Until at Least End of 2023, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 
16, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/827302da-4257-4bbc-a0fa-9bc98f65d661 
[https://perma.cc/HV5B-PPYT] (reporting that the Federal Reserve projected no interest rate 
increases until 2023).  
351. See Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (explaining how the “hunt for better yields” 
led many investors to the CLO market).  
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low interest rate environments, CLOs provide investors with attractive 
returns relative to similarly rated assets.352  Therefore, investor demand 
for CLOs is likely to remain robust as the economy recovers from the 
2020 downturn.353  Strong investor demand for CLOs in the lead up to 
2020 did, however, lend to the deterioration of lender protections in 
Credit Agreements.354  This trend will continue well past 2020 as demand 
prompts investors to compete for leveraged loans.355  Because widespread 
downgrades and borrower defaults in 2020 did little to scale back 
borrower-friendly terms in Credit Agreements, investors should not 
expect a shift towards greater lender protections in the future.356 
Even before the 2020 downturn, some suggested that the ship had 
sailed on covenant-lite loans and that the fight to bring fully covenanted 
loans357 back to the market was lost.358  To the extent the ship may have 
been lingering in the port, 2020 was the wind that finally set the vessel 
free.359  In revising TALF to allow Eligible CLOs to hold covenant-lite 
loans in an amount equal to 65% of the portfolio, the Federal Reserve 
implied its acceptance of the industry standard.360  A TALF program that 
 
352. See CAO ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (explaining that CLOs have attractive risk-return 
profiles, especially as compared to similarly rated securities in the market). 
353. See supra note 350 and accompanying text; see also Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 
10 (describing how the search for higher yields in low interest rate environments leads 
investors to the CLO market). 
354. Oldfield & Anthony, supra note 10 (“[S]trong investor demand has allowed CLO 
managers to loosen controls over investment quality such as to allow increases in permitted 
exposures to riskier loans.”).  
355. See Credit: 2020 Hindsight, supra note 309 (“[W]ith supply actually running below 
demand, investor appetite for acceptable deals is solid.”)  
356. See id. (suggesting that terms in Credit Agreements have returned to normal after 
moving slightly towards increased lender protections in the earliest months of the COVID-19 
pandemic). 
357. Loans with traditional covenants, as opposed to covenant-lite loans, have protective 
mechanisms built into the Credit Agreement for the safety and benefit of lenders.  For 
instance, a borrower might be required to remain in compliance with a financial maintenance 
covenant that measures the debt service capabilities of the borrower.  James Chen, Covenant-
Lite Loan Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/covenant-lite-
loans.asp [https://perma.cc/XW26-G7LV] (last updated Dec. 1, 2020). 
358. See Chappatta, supra note 349 (arguing, even before the onset of the pandemic, that 
covenant-lite loans are the new industry standard). 
359. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 12 (providing that 85% of loans that underly CLO 
portfolios are covenant-lite). 
360. See Wirz, supra note 245 (reporting that TALF was revised to allow Eligible CLOs 
to hold more covenant-lite loans). 
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restricted the ability of Eligible CLOs to hold covenant-lite loans would 
have reflected the concerns of regulators,361 but it would have proven 
unworkable in a market where the vast majority of loans are covenant-
lite.362  Ultimately, the Federal Reserve prioritized the goal of making 
TALF useful to the CLO market, indicating a tacit acceptance of 
covenant-lite loans as a significant part of the CLO market.363   
VI. CONCLUSION  
CLOs were survivors of the 2008 financial crisis.364  However, 
the praise CLOs received for successfully weathering the turmoil of 2008 
was short-lived.365  From a post-crisis trough of $263 billion,366 the CLO 
market surged to become the more than $600 billion market it is today,367 
and with this meteoric growth came spirited criticism.368  In recent years, 
CLO demand has purportedly caused corporate debt to reach 
unsustainable levels and has brought about a decline in underwriting 
standards.369  Prior to 2020, critics warned that in the event of a downturn, 
the outstanding $1.3 trillion of poor-quality corporate loans could prove 
ruinous to the CLOs that held them.370  In 2020, the economic downturn 
 
361. See Joy Wiltermuth & Kristen Haunss, Yellen Warns of Corporate Distress, Economic 
Fallout, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:55 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yellen-
distressed/yellen-warns-of-corporate-distress-economic-fallout-idUSKCN1QG2CZ 
[https://perma.cc/VJJ4-X36L] (discussing former Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen’s 
concerns regarding the proliferation of covenant-lite loans). 
362. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.  
363. See Wirz, supra note 245 (reporting that TALF was revised to allow Eligible CLOs 
to hold more covenant-lite loans). 
364. JOHNSON, supra note 30 at 1.   
365. Cf. Brown & Salander, supra note 3 (“For the past several years, market observers 
have warned of risks associated with collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs.”).  
366. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 37. 
367. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8.  
368. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1 (“[T]op Federal Reserve policymakers cited the 
surging growth of this market as a reason to ‘remain mindful of vulnerabilities’ and possible 
risks to the financial system.”). 
369. See supra Part III.  
370.  See Sally Bakewell, CLO Machine is Approaching Full-Tilt, and Credit Quality 
Suffers, BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-25/clo-machine-is-approaching-full-tilt-
and-credit-quality-suffers [https://perma.cc/7VWW-HNJL] (“[A] lot of CLOs have been 
stuffed with weaker credits.  A downturn, if and when that happens, will uncover these 
weaknesses.”).  
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caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was the kind of destabilizing event 
that critics of CLOs feared, yet CLOs escaped this financial instability 
relatively unscathed.371  
In spite of the many criticisms they faced prior to the 2020 
downturn, CLOs did not suffer the kinds of losses capable of sending 
shock waves through the economy.372  Ultimately, government support in 
the form of TALF and the structural strength of the CLO emerged as the 
primary reasons why CLOs were capable of weathering the volatility of 
2020.373  When the dust from the 2020 downturn finally settles, the CLO 
market may look modestly different as CLO Managers lobby for more 
flexibility to invest strategically in the post-pandemic market.374  
However, monumental change is not likely to grip the CLO market, as 
demand for CLOs will continue to encourage corporate borrowing and 
will produce the same borrower-friendly Credit Agreements that were 
predominant prior to the downturn.375 
 








371. See KOTHARI ET AL, supra note 8, at 41, 48 (explaining that the CLO market weathered 
the 2020 downturn and suggesting that the market is “headed for recovery”). 
372. See supra note 371 and accompanying text. 
373. See supra Part IV.B; supra Part IV.C. 
374. See supra Part V. 
375. See Credit: 2020 Hindsight, supra note 309 (suggesting that demand among investors 
remains strong and that, as of July 2020, Credit Agreements are continuing to incorporate the 
borrower-friendly terms that were common prior to the downturn). 
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